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Introduction 
Taiwan may be one of the most unique entities under international 
law. The international community acknowledges its existence, but is re-
luctant to recognize its statehood. Despite its status as a “non-recognized 
State,” or an “entity sui generis,”1 most countries engage in bilateral 
trade and establish “non-official” relations with Taiwan. These relations 
                                                                                                                         
 * Associate, Shearman & Sterling LLP, Washington DC; Editor, Chinese (Taiwan) 
Yearbook of International Law and Affairs; J.D., LL.M., University of Pennsylvania. I would 
like to thank Professor Jacques deLisle, Professor William Burke-White, Adam Perlin, Omar 
Serrano, and Melisma Cox for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this Article. I 
would also like to acknowledge the assistance of Christine Chang. 
 1. This concept may refer to “entities which maintain some sort of existence on the 
international plane in spite of their anomalous character” and “this is the situation of Taiwan 
(Formosa).” Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 63–65 (6th ed. 2003); 
Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law 166 (4th ed. 1997) (“Taiwan would appear to be a non-
state territorial entity which is de jure part of China but under separate administration.”). 
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are due to Taiwan’s trade power as the world’s 17th largest economy2 
and the third largest holder of foreign exchange reserves.3 During the 
last decade, Taiwan has transformed from an authoritarian regime into a 
full-fledged democracy. Hence, western countries regard Taiwan as a 
model of democracy for China and other developing countries, particu-
larly those in East Asia.4 
Lack of diplomatic recognition, however, has jeopardized Taiwan’s 
status in both foreign countries and international settings. As of now, 
only twenty-four countries, none of them world powers, give Taiwan full 
recognition.5 Facing diplomatic isolation, Taiwan can rarely use its offi-
cial name, Republic of China (ROC), abroad. The Taiwanese cannot 
display their national flag or sing their national anthem in international 
settings.6 The nation exists as one entity with multiple identities. For 
instance, Taiwan’s embassies may be called “Taipei Economic and Cul-
tural Office,” “Taipei Representative Office,” or “Chung Hwa Travel 
                                                                                                                         
 2. Republic of China, Government Information Office, A Brief Introduction to Tai-
wan: The Economy, http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/brief/info04_8.html (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2007). 
 3. Id. Taiwan has a trade balance of US $15,818 million and a per capita GNP of US 
$15,676. World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review, Report 
by Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, 2–3, WT/TPR/G/165, 
(May 16, 2006); U.S. Dep’t of State, Background Note: Taiwan, Bureau of East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs (Oct. 2007), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35855.htm.  
 4. Taiwan’s first direct presidential election was held in 1996. In 2000, the opposition 
party leader won the presidential election, ending more than 50 years of one-party rule. Re-
public of China, Government Information Office, Direct Presidential Election in Taiwan 
(ROC), http://www.gio.gov.tw/elect2004/news/tw04_05.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2008). See 
also Background Note: Taiwan, supra note 3 (“In March 2000, DPP candidate Chen Shui-
bian became the first opposition party candidate to win the presidency. His victory resulted in 
the first-ever transition of the presidential office from one political party to another, validating 
Taiwan’s democratic political system.”) 
 5. Twenty-four countries that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan (ROC) in-
clude: Europe (Holy See); East Asia and Pacific (Kirbati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, 
Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu); Central and South America (Belize, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, St. Christopher & Ne-
vis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent & Grenadines); and Africa (Burkina Faso, The Gambia, 
Malawi, Sao Tome & Principe, and Swaziland). Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of 
China (Taiwan), Embassies and Missions Abroad, http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/ 
lp.asp?ctNode=1019&CtUnit=30&BaseDSD=30&mp=6 (last visited Mar. 12, 2008).  
 6. E.g., Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the 
Republic of China 220 (1989)(stating that Taiwan “agreed to abandon, as required, the ROC 
flag and national anthem when participating in future Olympic Games”); Max Woodworth, 
It’s All Fun and Games until China Gets Hurt, Taipei Times, Dec. 20, 2001, at A11, available 
at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2001/12/20/116620 (“Tseng won first place 
at the World Cyber Games (WCG) in Seoul[.] . . . [He] rose from his seat and declared at the 
top of his voice ‘Taiwan No. 1!’ and waved a national flag. It is a violation of the games’ rules 
to display Taiwan’s national flag.”). 
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Service;”7 and its memberships in international organizations are often 
labeled “Chinese Taipei,” “Taipei, China,” or “China (Taiwan).”8  
Taiwan’s diplomatic problems result from pressure from The Peo-
ple’s Republic of China (PRC), and its insistence on the “one China” 
principle. The PRC asserts that, “there is but one China” and “Taiwan is 
an inalienable part of China.”9 China opposes any of Taiwan’s efforts to 
“split China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”10 The PRC’s asser-
tions gained force in a 1971 Resolution of the United Nations that 
transferred the China seat to the government in Beijing,11 subsequent to 
which most foreign nations, including the United States, terminated their 
diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Since then, foreign countries and in-
ternational organizations have frequently encountered the dilemma of 
how to grant Taiwan proper diplomatic treatment without offending 
China.  
This Article provides a comparative analysis of the status of the Re-
public of China on Taiwan in foreign and international settings. Most 
existing literature written from the traditional public international law 
perspective focuses on Taiwan’s separate statehood from China.12 This 
                                                                                                                         
 7. Republic of China’s Official, Semi-Official or Unofficial Missions Abroad, 20 Chi-
nese (Taiwan) Y.B. Int’l L. & Aff. 504, 504–20 (2002). 
 8. For instance, “Chinese Taipei” is used by the WTO and for purposes of the Olym-
pic Games; the Asian Development Bank refers to Taiwan as “Taipei China;” and “China 
(Taiwan)” is used by the International Cotton Advisory Committee. Most United Nations 
agencies use the term “Taiwan, Province of China.” See also Jacques deLisle, The Chinese 
Puzzle of Taiwan’s Status, 24 Orbis 35, 37 (2000) (describing how Taiwan uses “the alphabet 
soup of labels”). 
 9. Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, The Taiwan Question and Reunifica-
tion of China (Sept. 9, 1993), http://www.gwytb.gov.cn:8088/detail.asp (follow “The Taiwan 
Question and Reunification of China (1993-9-1)” hyperlink under “White Papers On Taiwan 
Issue”) [hereinafter 1993 White Papers]; Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, The One-
China Principle and the Taiwan Issue (Feb. 21, 2000), http://www.gwytb.gov.cn:8088/ 
index.asp (follow “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue (2000-2-21)” hyperlink 
under “White Papers On Taiwan Issue”) [hereinafter 2000 White Papers](arguing that the two 
Germanys formula should not apply to China-Taiwan relations).  
 10. 1993 White Papers, supra note 9. See also 2000 White Papers, supra note 9 (stating 
that China may use force “against the scheme to create an ‘independent Taiwan’ and against 
the foreign forces interfering with the reunification of China. . . .”). 
 11. G.A. Res. 2758, at 2, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, U.N. Doc. A/8439 
(Oct. 25, 1971), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 561 (1972). See Tien, supra note 6, at 219 (“In October 
1971, in yet another U.N. vote on the China seat, the United States dropped its lobbing on the 
ROC’s behalf and the China seat went to [Beijing]. The ROC had been ousted from the 
United Nations.”). 
 12. See e.g., Lung-chu Chen, Taiwan’s Current International Legal Status, 32 New 
Eng. L. Rev. 675, 676 (1998) (“Taiwan is an island nation, separate from continental China. 
Taiwan is Taiwan and China is China.”); Parris Chang & Kok-ui Lim, Taiwan’s Case for 
United Nations Membership, 1 UCLA J. Int’l L. & Foreign Aff. 393, 423 (1996–97) (“Taiwan 
has fulfilled the prerequisites for statehood, adhering to the rights and duties associated with 
states under international law.”); Y. Frank Chiang, One-China Policy and Taiwan, 28 Ford-
ham Int’l L.J. 1, 87 (2004) (“China has no sovereignty over the island of Taiwan and its 
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Article addresses an important pragmatic issue that international courts 
and courts in foreign countries frequently face: whether Taiwan is a 
“foreign State” for particular salutatory purposes in judicial proceedings. 
Part I of this Article provides an overview of China-Taiwan relations 
and the status of Taiwan under international law. I argue that the ROC 
on Taiwan has been a sovereign State since its creation in 1912 and was 
never “succeeded” by the PRC, which was established in 1949. By my 
analysis, both the ROC and the PRC are equal entities in the “divided 
China”; neither side belongs to the other. Part II examines the decisions 
of domestic courts that have addressed the status of Taiwan in the United 
States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Japan. In these countries 
(which do not recognize Taiwan as an autonomous entity, but nonethe-
less maintain substantial “non-official” ties with it), domestic courts 
have employed various devices to ensure the State-like status of Taiwan, 
thus safeguarding the country’s interests and allowing continued eco-
nomic and diplomatic relations with the ROC. Consequently, judicial 
recognition of Taiwan’s existence as a State has risen to the level of cus-
tomary international law. Part III explores the possibility of Taiwan 
bringing suit as a “State” before the International Court of Justice, as a 
“fishing entity” before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 
and as a “separate customs territory” in the dispute resolution mecha-
nism of the World Trade Organization. This Article concludes that to 
avoid creating a global judicial “black hole,” it is both necessary and 
pragmatic to officially deem Taiwan a State in judicial proceedings of 
any kind.  
I. Taiwan’s Status and its Relations with China 
A. Historical Background  
Taiwan fell to China in 1684 during the Ching Dynasty and was 
formally made a province of the Chinese Empire in 1885.13 After Japan 
defeated China in the Sino-Japanese war, the Ching Dynasty signed the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, ceding Taiwan “in perpetuity” to Ja-
                                                                                                                         
people. The one-China principle that the P.R.C. government advocates is flawed in its propo-
sition that Taiwan is part of China.”). For the view of the PRC, see generally Che-Fu Lee, 
China’s Perception of the Taiwan Issue, 32 New Eng. L. Rev. 695 (1998) and Zhengyuan Fu, 
China’s Perception of the Taiwan Issue, 1 UCLA J. Int’l L. & Foreign Aff. 321 (1996–97). 
 13. See Taiwan Yearbook 2007, History (2007), http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-
website/5-gp/yearbook/03history.html#04. See generally Gary Klintworth, New Taiwan, 
New China: Taiwan’s Changing Role in the Asia-Pacific Region 5 (1995)(“Taiwan was not 
associated with traditional Chinese territory in any formal way until the Ch’ing Dynasty and 
the [PRC’s] claim that Taiwan was part of ‘the sacred territory of China since ancient times’ is 
difficult to sustain.”). 
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pan.14 After the Second World War, the Japanese retreated from Taiwan 
under the terms of the Cairo Declaration, issued in 1943, which man-
dated that Taiwan “be returned to the Republic of China.” 15  The 
Republic of China, to which the Allied Powers referred, was the gov-
ernment of the Chinese Nationalist Party, which had overthrown the 
Ching Dynasty in 1912. After the Chinese civil war between the Nation-
alist Party and the Communist Party, the Chinese Communist Party 
proclaimed the establishment of the PRC in 1949. The defeated ROC 
government, led by the Nationalist Party, retreated to Taiwan. Since 
then, China has had two regimes, the PRC on Mainland China and the 
ROC on Taiwan. The PRC planned to “liberate” Taiwan while the ROC 
intended to “counterattack and recover” the mainland. Both sides 
claimed to be the only legitimate government representing China and 
thus commenced a zero-sum race in diplomatic battles.16  
For two decades, the ROC on Taiwan continued to represent the 
“old China.” It enjoyed diplomatic recognition by most States and had 
membership in the United Nations, of which the ROC was a founding 
State. In the 1970s, the world abruptly moved away from recognizing 
Taiwan as a separate State. In 1971, with allied developing countries 
siding with the PRC, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 2758, 
expelling the ROC and giving China’s seat to the PRC.17 In less than one 
year, Taiwan was ousted from most UN-affiliated organizations. Even 
worse for Taiwan’s cause, in 1979 the United States, Taiwan’s long-term 
ally, decided to recognize the PRC as the representative government of 
China and terminated diplomatic relations with the ROC on Taiwan.  
                                                                                                                         
 14. Treaty of Shimonoseki, China-Japan, art. 2, May 8, 1895, 181 Consol. T.S. 
217(“China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territories, together 
with all fortifications, arsenals, and public property thereon: . . . (b) The island of Formosa, 
together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said island of Formosa . . . .”). 
 15. The Cairo Declaration was issued by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek of the Re-
public of China, Prime Minister Winston Churchill of the United Kingdom, and President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States. The Declarations stated that “all the territories 
Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be 
returned to the Republic of China.” Cairo Conference, 9 Dep’t. St. Bull. 393 (Dec. 1, 1943). 
 16. See Cho Hui-Wan, Taiwan’s Application to GATT/WTO: Significance of Multi-
lateralism for an Unrecognized State 112 (2001) (discussing that the ROC and the PRC 
“have been in diplomatic war with each other to win recognition by foreign states as ‘the sole 
legal government of China. Both say there is only one China, but until 1992 each claimed to 
be ‘the one’ representing China”); Che-Fu, supra note 12, at 326 (“Despite all the deep ani-
mosity between the CCP and the KMT, both sides believed that there is only one China, and 
Taiwan is a part of China.”). 
 17. See Cho, supra note 16, at 116–18 (discussing the ROC’s withdrawal from the 
United Nations).  
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B. The Statehood of Taiwan under International Law 
After the 1970’s, due to lack of membership in most State-oriented 
UN organs and the derecognition by major world powers, Taiwan’s in-
ternational status became a complex puzzle. Most countries find it 
thorny to deal with the unique relationship between China and Taiwan. 
To understand the issue of Taiwan’s statehood, it is important to discuss 
cross-strait relations. In my view, the PRC-ROC relationship can be de-
picted as two equal entities in one divided China. On the one hand, 
Taiwan did not declare independence from “old China,” to which both 
Mainland China and Taiwan once belonged. An independent “Republic 
of Taiwan” never came into existence. The state of the ROC remains the 
same. The only change after 1949 was the land and the population it 
controls. On the other hand, the PRC, since its creation, has never exer-
cised jurisdiction over Taiwan and its outer islands.18 Hence, the PRC 
and the ROC are separate but equal, and neither belongs to the other.  
The concept of divided States can be illustrated by the Korean and 
German examples. The fact that the constitutions of both Koreas uphold 
the principle of “one Korea” does not prevent the two Koreas from pos-
sessing separate international personalities.19 The German example went 
even further. In December 1972, the two Germanys concluded a treaty to 
normalize their relations.20 The Constitutional Court of the Federal Re-
public of Germany affirmed the constitutionality of the Basic Treaty, 
ruling that relations between the “two parts of Germany with separate 
statehood” should be “governed by international law.”21 Both Germanys 
were, and both Koreas are, widely recognized by most foreign countries 
and were entitled to UN membership.22 However, the PRC disputes the 
                                                                                                                         
 18. See Lee Teng-hui, Understanding Taiwan: Bridging the Perception Gap, Foreign 
Aff., Nov.–Dec. 1999, at 9 (“In the 50 years since the P.R.C. was founded, both sides of the 
Taiwan Strait have been separately ruled, with neither subordinate to the other. This situation 
has not changed in any substantive way since 1949.”). 
 19. Const. of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of 1998 art. 9 (“the DPRK shall 
strive [to] . . . reunify the country on the principle of independence, peaceful reunification and 
great national unity.”); Const. of Republic of Korea art. 4 (“The Republic of Korea shall seek 
unification and shall formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the 
principles of freedom and democracy.”). 
 20. See Hungdah Chiu, The International Law of Recognition and Multi-System Na-
tions—With Special Reference to the Chinese (Mainland-Taiwan) Case, 1 Chinese (Taiwan) 
YB of Intl L. and Aff. 1 4–5 (1981); see also Markus G. Puder, The Grass Will Not Be Tram-
pled Because The Tigers Need Not Fight— New Thoughts and Old Paradigms for Détente 
Across the Taiwan Strait, 34 Van. J. Transnat’l L. 481, 524–25 (2001)(stating that the Ger-
man experience may be applied to China-Taiwan relations). 
 21. Chiu, supra note 20, at 5. 
 22. For further discussions on the concept of divided states and the German and Korean 
examples, see Divided States, 1 Encyclopedia of Public International Law 1085–89 (1992); 
see also Yung Wei, Recognition of Divided States: Implications and Application of Concepts 
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two–Koreas and two–Germanys formulas, and contends that the division 
of these two countries occurred because of arrangements by foreign su-
perpowers. The PRC argues that this “external factor” makes the 
situation between Taiwan and China inherently different from the Ger-
man example.23  
The PRC’s argument is flawed because under international law the 
reason for a country’s formation has no impact on the determination of 
its statehood. In other words, neither an “external factor,” such as for-
eign intervention, nor an “internal factor,” such as civil war, has any 
bearing on the ROC’s status as a State. Instead, the factors that deter-
mine the ROC’s statehood must be limited to those given in Article I of 
the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States.24 Article I 
stipulates that a State should possess four characteristics, including 1) a 
permanent population; 2) a defined territory; 3) a government; and 4) 
capacity to enter into relations with other States. The ROC on Taiwan 
meets all four requirements.25 
First, the ROC has a permanent population that currently numbers 
23 million living on Taiwan and its outlying islands.26 Second, the ROC 
has a territory of “existing national boundaries.” Some argue that the 
ROC’s territory is yet to be defined because of disputes with China over 
territory.27 Nonetheless, international law does not require fully defined 
territory. Both Russia and Japan have disputed territories with China, yet 
their statehoods have never been challenged.28 Third, the ROC is an 
                                                                                                                         
of “Multi-System Nations,” “Political Entities,” and “Intra-Commonwealth,” 34 Int’l L. 997 
(2000). 
 23. See 2000 White Papers, supra note 9 (arguing that the two Germanys formula 
should not apply to China-Taiwan relations). 
 24. Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 
Stat. 3097, 3100, 165 L.N.T.S. 17. See also Thomas D. Grant, Defining Statehood: The Mon-
tevideo Convention and Its Discounts, 37 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 403, 408 (1999) (stating that 
the convention is the “source most often cited as authority on the definition of the state.”).  
 25. For discussions regarding Taiwan’s statehood under Article I of the Montevideo 
Convention, see Chang & Lim, supra note 12, at 420–23; Tzu-Wen Lee, The International 
Legal Status of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 1 UCLA J. Int’l L. & Foreign Aff. 351, 
387–88 (1996–1997); Christopher J. Carolan, Note, The “Republic of Taiwan”: A Legal-
Historical Justification for a Taiwanese Declaration of Independence, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429, 
451–56 (2000). 
 26. Taiwan: History, Geography, Government, and Culture—Infoplease.com, http:// 
www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0108020.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2008). 
 27. See Brownlie, supra note 1, at 71 (“[T]he existence of fully defined frontiers is not 
required and . . . what matters is the effective establishment of a political community.”). 
Shaw, supra note 1, at 139 (“[T]here is no necessity in international law for defined and set-
tled boundaries, . . . so long as there is a consistent band of territory which is undeniably 
controlled by the government of the alleged state.”). 
 28. See Gregory Clark, Northern Territories Dispute Highlights Flawed 
Diplomacy, Japan Times Online, Mar. 24, 2005, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ 
eo20050324gc.html. 
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autonomous government independent of the PRC. The people of Taiwan 
democratically elect leaders of both the central and local governments.29 
Finally, the ROC has the capacity to conduct foreign relations. It main-
tains representative offices in almost 100 countries, 30  and it has 
concluded treaties and agreements even with countries with which Tai-
wan has no formal relations. 31  Moreover, the ROC possesses full 
membership in numerous international organizations, including the 
World Trade Organization and the Asian Development Bank.32 Some 
contend that the ROC is unable to establish diplomatic relations with 
most countries, hence undermining its capacity to conduct foreign rela-
tions. However, Taiwan’s main obstacle to maintaining foreign relations 
is China’s pressure on foreign States, not Taiwan’s incapacity to conduct 
foreign relations. Using this explanation, it is not difficult to distinguish 
Taiwan from other State-like entities that lack diplomatic relations with 
other countries. For instance, although Chechnya and Northern Cyprus 
may satisfy the first three criteria under Article I of the Montevideo 
Convention, they lack the capacity to enter into relations with foreign 
States and international organizations.33  
Taiwan’s lack of diplomatic recognition does not affect its status as 
a State. There are two main theories of diplomatic recognition in interna-
tional law.34 According to the constitutive theory, recognition constitutes 
an essential element of statehood. This approach is difficult to adopt in 
practice because “states cannot by their independent judgment establish 
any competence of other states.”35 The prevailing view of recognition is 
                                                                                                                         
 29. See Jonathan Manthorpe, Opposition wins Taiwan election, Nat’l Post, Mar. 22, 
2008, http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=393804 (last visited May 7, 2008); 
Bowing Out: Electoral humiliation marks the end of the Chen Shui-bian era, Economist, Jan. 
19, 2008, available at http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id= 
10533931. 
 30. See generally, Taiwan, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Dep’t. of State, 
supra note 3. For the complete list of Taiwan’s representative offices abroad, see Taiwan, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China, 
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/lp.asp?CtNode= 
279&CtUnit=30&BaseDSD=30&mp=1 (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).  
 31. See, e.g., Taiwan, Ministry of Finance, Republic of China, http://www.dot.gov.tw/ 
en/display/tax-treaty-policy.asp. (last visited Mar. 23, 2008). 
 32. Taiwan currently has memberships in twenty-two international organizations. See 
Taiwan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China, http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/ 
lp.asp?ctNode=1037&CtUnit=46&BaseDSD=39&mp=6 (last visited Mar. 23, 2008). 
 33. Chechnya and Northern Cyprus are not members of any international organization. 
Northern Cyprus is recognized only by Turkey. See generally Anthony Comfort, Policy De-
partment Note on Turkey and the Problem of the Recognition of Cyprus, available at http:// 
www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/nt/553/553930/553930en.pdf. 
 34. See I.A. Shearer, Starke’s International Law 117–21 (11th ed. 1994) for discus-
sions on recognition. See also Lee, supra note 12, at 386 (“[T]he international status of a state 
is established ‘independently of recognition.’ ”). 
 35. Brownlie, supra note 1, at 88. 
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the declaratory theory, which asserts that recognition is only the formal 
acknowledgement of statehood or government.36 In the Tinoco Conces-
sions Arbitration, a case between the United Kingdom and Costa Rica, 
the arbitrator pointed out that, on the basis of international law, “non-
recognition for any reason, however, cannot outweigh the evidence dis-
closed by this record before me as to the de facto character of Tinoco’s 
government.”37 A US Court of Appeals in Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist 
Federated Soviet Republic also held that “whether or not a government 
exists . . . is a fact, not a theory.”38 Consequently, the ROC’s status as a 
State is not undermined by a lack of recognition.  
In practice, despite the lack of formal relations, courts in foreign 
States explicitly and implicitly recognize that Taiwan meets the “State” 
requirements for particular legal purposes, and hold that Taiwan is not 
part of the PRC, but of the ROC.39 By recognizing the statehood of both 
the PRC and the ROC, their relations should be governed by interna-
tional law and, as a consequence, both sides would be obliged to settle 
their disputes peacefully.40 The International Court of Justice would re-
solve political conflicts, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
would determine maritime disputes, and the dispute resolution mecha-
nism of the World Trade Organization would resolve trade issues.  
II. Foreign Court Decisions Regarding 
the Sovereignty of Taiwan 
A. Practice of Foreign Courts 
After the 1970s, most major States switched recognition from the 
ROC to the PRC. This political decision has created complex legal is-
sues for domestic courts. The question of how to treat Taiwan, an ally 
formally recognized as the ROC, became a high-profile judicial puzzle 
that triggered a series of sensitive diplomatic maneuvers. Below is an 
                                                                                                                         
 36. Id. at 87–88. The status of a state does not depend on whether it receives diplomatic 
recognition from other states. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States § 202 cmts. a, b (1987). 
 37. Brownlie, supra note 1, at 88. 
 38. Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 138 N.E. 24,24 
(N.Y. 1923); see also Upright v. Mercury Business Machines Co., 213 N.Y.S.2d. 417, 419 
(1961) (“A foreign government, although not recognized by the political arm of the United 
States Government, may nevertheless have de facto existence which is juridically cogniza-
ble.”). 
 39. See Shearer, supra note 34, at 123 (discussing examples of “legitimate occasions 
for conclusively implying recognition”). 
 40. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3 (“All Members shall settle their international dis-
putes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, 
are not endangered.”). 
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exploration of judicial decisions in countries with which Taiwan main-
tains substantial “unofficial” relations and their treatment of the question 
of Taiwan’s status as an independent State. 
1. United States 
The ROC has been an old ally of the United States. The two coun-
tries concluded the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1955 in the aftermath of 
the Chinese Civil War and Korean War.41 However, in the 1970s, the 
United States began normalizing relations with the PRC as a result of 
Sino-Soviet conflicts.42 In 1972, President Richard Nixon visited China 
and the U.S. and the PRC issued the Shanghai Communique, in which 
the United States “acknowledge[d]” that “there is but one China” and 
“Taiwan is a part of China.”43 On January 1, 1979, President Jimmy Car-
ter formally announced the decision to terminate relations with the ROC 
and to recognize the PRC as “the sole legal government of China.”44 
Several days later, Taiwan was notified by the United States that the 
Mutual Defense Treaty would be terminated on January 1, 1980.45 
President Carter’s decision was a shock to Taiwan, and infuriated 
the U.S. Congress, where most members felt that the United States’ 
abandonment of its long-time ally would severely affect its credibility 
with other countries.46 Members of Congress attempted to salvage U.S.-
                                                                                                                         
 41. The Treaty was signed by representatives of both nations on December 2, 1954 and 
was approved by the Senate and signed by the President on February 11, 1955. Goldwater v. 
Carter, 617 F. 2d 697, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See generally Mutual Defense Treaty, U.S.- 
China, Dec. 2, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 434. In particular, Article V of the Treaty provides that each 
nation “would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional process.” 
 42. See John R. Bolton, About “Dual Recognition,” http://www.fapa.org/dualrecognition/ 
aboutdualrecog207.html (“Nixon believed that ‘playing the China card’ would gain for the 
United States and unusual and highly unexpected ally in the global struggle against the Soviet 
Union and its satellites.”). 
 43. See Tien, supra note 6, at 233; Before Nixon’s visit, he sent Henry Kissinger, U.S. 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to Beijing to negotiate the meeting of 
leaders of the two countries. For Nixon’s policy on China-Taiwan relations, see Chiang, supra 
note 12, at 49–53. 
 44. The Normalization Communiqué and Associated Documents in Richard C. Bush, 
At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations Since 1942 138 (2004). On December 30, 1978, 
President Carter signed a memorandum “recognizing the government of the People’s Republic 
of China as the sole legal government of China and . . . terminating diplomatic relations with 
the Republic of China.” President’s Memorandum for All Departments and Agencies: Rela-
tions with the People of Taiwan, reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 36, 75 [hereinafter 
“President’s Memorandum”]. The President’s Memorandum also acknowledged that the 
United States wished to maintain relations “with the people of Taiwan without official gov-
ernment representation and without diplomatic relations.” Id.  
 45. Goldwater, 617 F. 2d at 700. 
 46. At a debate during the first U.S. Congress on March 12, 1979, Sen. David Boren 
stated that “[t]he government on Taiwan, the Republic of China, has never done anything to 
deserve mistreatment by the Government of the United States. They have been our friend.” 14 
Chinese (Taiwan) YB Int’l L. & Aff. 128 (1995–96). 
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Taiwan relations by enacting the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which 
became the first and only U.S. legislation designed for an unrecognized 
State.47 The TRA outlines the relationship between the United States and 
Taiwan. Its purpose is to ensure non-official relations between the peo-
ple, instead of the governments, of the two countries.48 In particular, the 
TRA stipulates that “[t]he absence of diplomatic relations or recognition 
shall not affect the application of the laws of the United States with re-
spect to Taiwan.”49  
The TRA is the only comprehensive domestic statute in the world 
governing relations with Taiwan.50 Due to substantial relations between 
Taiwan and the United States, the courts’ judicial interpretations of 
Taiwan’s status and the TRA provide abundant guidance, to which many 
                                                                                                                         
 47. Members of Congress also challenged the President’s unilateral termination of the 
Mutual Defense Treaty. In Goldwater v. Carter, they argued that the President’s decision con-
travened Congress’ “advice and consent” power under the U.S. Constitution. In their view, 
since two-thirds of the Senate vote is required to ratify a treaty, the same process should be 
followed to abrogate a treaty. Yet, the efforts of Congress failed. In 1979, the U.S. Supreme 
Court vacated the Circuit Court’s decision, which had sided with Congress, and held that the 
current case was not yet ripe for judicial review due to the lack of a constitutional impasse. 
Four concurring Justices held the view that this was a political question, which the Court 
should not review. See generally Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). See U.S. Const., 
art. II, § 2 (“The President . . . shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”); see also Colin 
P.A. Jones, United States Arms Exports to Taiwan Under The Taiwan Relations Act: The 
Failed Role of Law in United States Foreign Relations, 9 Conn. J. Int’l L. 51, 56 (1993) (de-
tailing the case of Goldwater v. Carter). It is noteworthy that Article V of the U.S.-ROC 
Mutual Defense Treaty stipulates that it would remain in force “indefinitely,” but states that 
“[e]ither Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party.” How-
ever, the Treaty does not contain specific provisions regarding the process of terminating the 
Treaty.  
 48. 22 U.S.C. §§ 3301–16 (2000) (“[The Act] authorize[s] the continuation of commer-
cial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on 
Taiwan.”). 
 49. 22 U.S.C. § 3303 (2000). 
 50. For instance, the Taiwan Relations Act provides that U.S.-PRC diplomatic relations 
depend on “the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.” 
22 U.S.C. § 3301 (2000). In addition, “to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peace-
ful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, [is] . . . of grave concern to the United States.” 
Id. See Jones, supra note 47, at 60–62 (describing US arms sales to Taiwan); Steven M. Gold-
stein & Randall Schriver, An Uncertain Relationship: The United States, Taiwan and the 
Taiwan Relations Act, 165 China Q. 147, 149–51 (2001) (explaining some controversial terms 
in the TRA). There are two significant points concerning the TRA and U.S. courts’ interpreta-
tions of that statute. First, the TRA is not construed as a “treaty,” but as U.S. domestic law. 
Hence, it is erroneous to state, as some Taiwanese politicians have claimed, that the U.S. bears 
an “international obligation” to protect Taiwan. Legally speaking, unlike the Mutual Defense 
Treaty, Taiwan is unable to invoke the TRA to ask the U.S. to defend Taiwan, should it be 
attacked by China. Secondly, the TRA is unique in that Congress intended to treat Taiwan as 
if it were a state without “recognizing” it as a state, a view that has been consistently upheld 
by the judicial branch. Congress’ enactment of the TRA has been widely considered to be 
successful in guaranteeing Taiwan’s interests and promoting substantive relations between the 
two nations. 
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other foreign courts refer. Judicial disputes involving Taiwan, or the 
ROC, occurred in the pre-TRA era. During that period, U.S. courts either 
recognized the ROC on Taiwan as the “de jure government of China,”51 
or deemed “Formosa,” the ancient name of Taiwan, to be a nation for the 
purposes of a particular statute.52 Hence, the State status of Taiwan in 
U.S. courts was not substantially in doubt.  
Nonetheless, problems arose following the termination of diplomatic 
relations. Taiwan’s greatest concern was the transfer of the ROC’s prop-
erty to the PRC. Under international law, such transfer is the automatic 
result of “State succession.”53 Taiwan was aware of this consequence. To 
avoid this result, Taiwan sold its embassy property, known as “Twin 
Oaks,”54 which the ROC had acquired in 1947, to the Friends of Free 
China, a private organization chaired by pro-Taiwan Congressmen.55 
This “sale” was for the nominal sum of U.S. $10 and was executed on 
December 22, 1978, seven days before President Carter announced the 
termination of formal relations with the ROC on Taiwan.56  
The PRC asked the U.S. government to block the transfer of the em-
bassy property to Friends of Free China, contending that all government 
properties of China belonged to the PRC.57 Ultimately, the TRA pre-
vented the invalidation of this transfer by declaring that the absence of 
recognition of the ROC does not affect property interests “heretofore or 
hereafter acquired by or with respect to Taiwan.”58 Because of this pro-
                                                                                                                         
 51. See Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Rep. of China, 254 F.2d 177, 187 (4th Cir. 1958). 
(“[T]he vessels were sold to the ‘Government of the Republic of China’ and not to the Chi-
nese state . . . and further, that the Nationalist government, in the US law, was still the de jure 
government of China . . . .”). 
 52. See Rogers v. Cheng Fu Sheng, 280 F.2d 663, 664–65 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (holding 
that Formosa is a “country” within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act).  
 53. See Aspects of the Law of State Succession, International Law Association (2004), 
at 3 (“In all the types of State succession the transfer of an immobile property to the successor 
was confirmed. Specific regulations concern a destiny of mobile property in particular types 
of succession.”).  
 54. For an introduction to Twin Oaks, see The Republic of China’s (Taiwan) Twin 
Oaks Estate, http://www.taiwanembassy.org/us/content.asp?CuItem=11441 (last visited Mar. 
23, 2008). 
 55. Property of “De-recognized” Government, 14 Chinese (Taiwan) YB Int’l L. & 
Aff. 105 (1995–96). 
 56. How Twin Oaks Came to be Sold for a Mere $10, Taipei Update, Apr. 16, 2001, at 
8, available at http://dc.roc-taiwan.org/tpupdate/html/no014/css/no014_8.htm (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2008). 
 57. See Property of “De-recognized” Government 14 Chinese (Taiwan) YB Int’l L. & 
Aff. 105–06 (1995–96) (citing Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher’s testimony 
that “[w]ith respect to diplomatic property that was acquired before 1949, . . . that diplomatic 
property belongs to the People’s Republic of China . . . .”). The US Department of State sup-
ported the PRC’s claim that “diplomatic property” acquired prior to 1949 should belong to the 
PRC. Id. 
 58. Taiwan Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. § 3303(b)(3)(A) (2000). In 1982, the Friends of 
China Association transferred Twin Oaks back to the ROC government. Later, the ROC gov-
HSIEH FINAL TYPE_C.DOC 6/8/2008  8:04 PM 
Summer 2007] An Unrecognized State  777 
 
vision, the case of the RPC’s diplomatic real property never went to 
court. 
Nonetheless, U.S. courts encountered more complex issues regard-
ing the ROC’s bank deposits in the United States. The first case 
addressing this problem was the Wells Fargo Bank case.59 In 1949, due 
to the civil war in China, the Bank of China’s headquarters moved to 
Taipei. The Liberation Army took over the old office in Shanghai and 
claimed “to have succeeded to the ownership” of the bank, thus dividing 
it.60 In 1953, both Banks of China claimed to be entitled to funds depos-
ited in a Wells Fargo Bank branch in California. To decide which bank 
was the real depositor, the court followed the executive branch’s view 
that the ROC on Taiwan was the recognized government and ruled that 
the Bank of China in Taipei was entitled to the fund.61 
Following the derecognition of the ROC, another American court 
encountered a similar question.62 After 1949, the Bank of China in 
Taipei was reorganized and was renamed the International Commercial 
Bank of China (ICBC). The New York branch maintained allegiance 
with Taipei, but the two branches in Pakistan sided with Beijing. The 
two Pakistan branches maintained deposits in the New York bank.63 
Subsequently, the PRC transferred control of the two branches to Paki-
stan. The National Bank of Pakistan brought suit against the ICBC and 
claimed the assets in the New York account. The ICBC urged the court 
to consider the precedent set by the Wells Fargo Bank case, meaning 
that the Bank of Pakistan should be collaterally estopped from claiming 
rights to the deposit. The court rejected this argument, holding that be-
cause the Wells Fargo Bank decision rested upon the formal recognition 
                                                                                                                         
ernment built a large new “non-embassy” on Wisconsin Avenue and uses Twin Oaks for “un-
official entertaining.” June Teufel Dreyer, Taiwan Security Research, China’s Attitude 
Toward the Taiwan Relations Act n. 41 (May 1999), available at http://taiwansecurity.org/ 
IS/IS-Dreyer.htm.  
 59. See Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 104 F.Supp. 59, 61–63 
(N.D. Cal. 1952); see also Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 209 F.2d 
467 (9th Cir. 1953). 
 60. Wells Fargo Bank, 104 F.Supp. at 62. 
 61. Nonetheless, the court conceded that “neither of the rival Banks of China is a true 
embodiment of the corporate entity which made the deposit in the Wells Fargo Bank.” Wells 
Fargo Bank, 104 F.Supp. at 66. See also Wells Fargo Bank, 104 F.Supp. at 62. (stating that it 
is not proper for the court to determine “which government best represents the interests of the 
Chinese State in the Bank of China” and thus the court “should justly accept . . . that govern-
ment which our executive deems best able to further the mutual interest of China and the 
United States.”). The Court of Appeals also awarded interests to the Bank of China in Taipei. 
See Wells Fargo Bank, 209 F.2d 467 at 477. 
 62. See Nat’l Bank of Pakistan v. Int’l Bank of Pakistan v. Int’l Commerce Bank of 
China, 1999 N.Y.L.J., Apr. 13, 1988 at 11; Nat’l Bank of Pakistan v. Int’l Commerce Bank of 
China, 543 N.Y.S.2d 601 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). 
 63. Nat’l Bank of Pakistan, 1999 N.Y.L.J., at 11. 
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of the ROC, it was inapplicable after the normalization of US-PRC rela-
tions.64 Further, the court stated that the TRA “does not mandate a 
different conclusion.”65  
Arguably, the National Bank of Pakistan decision is erroneous, as it 
ignored the executive branch’s intent that the ROC’s bank deposits 
should “continue unaffected by normalization.”66 More importantly, the 
court misinterpreted the TRA.67 In contrast to the court’s finding that the 
TRA is inapplicable, the TRA clearly stipulates that Taiwan’s status un-
der US laws would not be affected by the absence of recognition.68 
Legislative history further shows that that the legal rights under the TRA 
contain those “involving bank assets.”69 Consequently, the court’s deci-
sion contravened the purpose of the TRA and violated the clear mandate 
of the TRA by holding that Wells Fargo Bank was inapplicable.  
Despite this one outlier, in nearly all subsequent cases, US courts 
have consistently applied the TRA. These cases indicate that the “derec-
ognition of Taiwan did not change Taiwan’s status as a nation.”70 For 
instance, in Dupont Circle Citizen’s Association v. D.C. Bd. of Zoning 
Adjustment, the court held that Taiwan’s de facto embassy met the defi-
nition of “chancery,” the equivalent to a “foreign mission,” within the 
meaning of zoning regulations.71 Therefore, Taiwan’s office should “be 
treated as if derecognition has not occurred.”72 The court noted that the 
                                                                                                                         
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. (“Because the [TRA] was promulgated after the United States declared it 
would recognize the PRC as the sole legal government of China, there is no basis to support 
ICBC’s contention that the act was intended to continue the pre-1978 status between the ROC 
and the United States.”). 
 66. Letter from Herbet J. Hansell, Legal Advisor of the Dep’t of State, to Sen. Frank 
Church, Chairman of the Committee (Feb. 16, 1979) Chinese (Taiwan) Y.B. Int’l L. & Aff. 
106 (1995–96). 
 67. See Mitchell A. Silk & Lester Ross, Transnational Deposits, Government Succes-
sion, Frozen Assets and the Taiwan Relations Act: National Bank of Pakistan v. The 
International Commercial Bank of China, 8 Int’l Tax & Bus. L. 1, 25 (1990) (arguing that the 
decision was in violation of the TRA). 
 68. Under the TRA, US laws “shall apply with respect to Taiwan in the manner that the 
laws of the United States applied . . . Taiwan prior to January 1, 1979. Moreover, according to 
the TRA, the derecognition of the ROC ‘shall not abrogate, infringe, [or] modify’ any rights 
acquired by Taiwan before 1979.” Taiwan Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. § 3303 (1979). 
 69. H.R.Rep. No. 96-26, pt. 1 at 9 (1985). 
 70. N.Y. Chinese TV Programs, Inc. v. U.E. Enterprises, 954 F.2d 847, 853 (2d Cir. 
1992). 
 71. Dupont Circle Citizens Ass’n. v. D.C. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 530 A.2d 1163, 
1170 (D.C. 1987). A “chancery” is a principle office of “a foreign mission used for diplomatic 
or used for diplomatic or related purposes . . . .” Id. at 1166 (citing 11 DCMR § 199.9 (1986)). 
Furthermore, a foreign mission is defined as “any mission to or agency or entity in the United 
States which is involved in the diplomatic, consular, or other activities of, or which is substan-
tially owned or effectively by . . . a foreign government . . . .” 22 U.S.C.A. § 4302(a)(3) (West 
2007 & Supp. 1987). 
 72. Dupont Circle Citizens, 530 A.2d at 1170.  
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language of the TRA states that lack of recognition “shall not” affect the 
application of U.S. laws regarding Taiwan, and stressed that the word 
“shall . . . creates a duty, not an option.”73 Later, the court also ruled that 
regulations of Taiwan are considered “foreign law” under U.S. law.74 
Furthermore, the courts have consistently recognized that Taiwan’s sov-
ereign acts fall under the “Act of State doctrine”75 in U.S. law, and that 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA)76 applies to Taiwan’s State-
owned enterprises,77 government agencies,78 and officials79 subject to 
limited exceptions under the FSIA.80  
U.S. courts have consistently held that on the basis of the TRA, the 
ROC-U.S. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN 
Treaty, concluded in 1948) continue to be effective.81 They observed that 
                                                                                                                         
 73. Id. The Department of State agreed that Taiwan’s office should be treated “as if it 
were a chancery for purposes of” the zoning regulations. Id. at 1168. 
 74. United States v. 594,464 Pounds of Salmon, 874 F.2d 824, 828, 830 (9th Cir. 
1989). The court held that Taiwanese regulations restricting the importation of salmon is “for-
eign law” under the Lancey Act and, therefore, a violation that triggers the Act’s civil 
forfeiture provision. Id. 
 75. E.g., Millen Industries, Inc. v. Coordination Council for N. Am. Affairs, 855 F.2d 
879, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“The doctrine applies with reference to Taiwan even though the 
United States does not recognize that government.”). Under the act of state doctrine, a nation 
is sovereign within its territory and its domestic actions should not be questioned by foreign 
courts. Regarding the application of the doctrine, courts usually defer to the executive branch. 
See First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972). 
 76. Under the FSIA, “a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts 
of the United States,” subject to some exceptions. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 1604 (1994). In addition, that immunity extends to “a political subdivision of a for-
eign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.” Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1994). 
 77. See, e.g., Kao Hwa Shipping Co. v. China Steel Corp., 816 F. Supp. 910 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993) (holding that the Taiwan Steel Company is an instrumentality of Taiwan and is, there-
fore, entitled to immunity). 
 78. See, e.g., Chu v. Taiwan Tobacco & Wine Monopoly Bureau, 30 F.3d 139 (1994) 
(finding that the Bureau is a government defendant and thus immune from jurisdiction). 
 79. See, e.g., Taiwan v. U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 128 F.3d 712 (1997) 
(deciding that the court is unable to compel Taiwanese diplomats to testify in U.S. courts). 
Such immunity is based on the Taiwan Relations Act, which provides Taiwanese diplomats 
with immunities for “the effective performance” of their functions, 22 U.S.C. § 3309(c). 
 80. See Sun v. Taiwan, 201 F.3d 1105, 1107–08 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that Taiwan’s 
study tour for overseas Chinese is a “commercial activity” for purposes of the FSIA). How-
ever, in a subsequent appeal of the same case, the court affirmed that the district court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction under the commercial activity exception because there is no nexus 
between the plaintiff’s action and the commercial activity in the United States. Sun v. Taipei 
Eco. & Cultural Representative Office, 34 F.App’x. 529, 531 (9th Cir. 2002). See also Liu v. 
Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1425 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the assassination of the 
plaintiff operated by ROC officials constitutes the tortious activity exception under the FSIA). 
 81. See Chang v. Northwestern Mem’l Hosp., 506 F. Supp. 975, 977–78 (N.D. Ill. 1980) 
(stating that under the FCN Treaty and the TRA, citizens of Taiwan are entitled to sue in federal 
courts as citizens of recognized states); N.Y. Chinese T.V. Programs v. U.E. Enterprises, Inc., 
954 F. Supp. 841, 847, 853–54 (D.N.J 1996) (finding that replacing the name “ROC” with 
Taiwan in the FCN Treaty does not affect its validity). See generally Virginia K. DeMarchi, 
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the United States maintains “de facto recognition” of Taiwan and U.S.-
Taiwan relations are “quasi government relations.”82 This interpretation 
is consistent with the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, 
which stipulates that “[t]he severance of diplomatic or consular relations 
between parties to a treaty does not affect the legal relations established 
between them by the treaty.”83 
Regarding Taiwan’s international treaties, the U.S. courts provide 
the most informative legal analysis. Two district court decisions are par-
ticularly problematic. These two decisions involve Taiwan and the 
Warsaw Convention, an international treaty providing limited liability 
for an air carrier and limiting the fora in which suits can be brought.84 It 
should be first noted that, although the ROC was involved in the drafting 
of the Warsaw Convention in 1927, it never ratified it, and thus never 
became a “High Contracting Party” to the Convention. Nonetheless, in 
1958, the PRC joined the Warsaw Convention with the declaration that 
the Convention “shall of course apply to the entire Chinese territory in-
cluding Taiwan.”85 Because the Warsaw Convention only applies to 
shipments between parties,86 controversies arise from whether Taiwan is 
bound by the Convention, to which it is not a party. Recognizing Taiwan 
as a party to the Convention would imply that Taiwan is under the 
PRC’s jurisdiction.  
In Lee v. China Airlines, a district court dismissed the suit by the 
plaintiffs—who suffered injuries as a result of a sudden drop during a 
flight from Hong Kong via Taipei to San Francisco—due to the absence 
of jurisdiction according to the Warsaw Convention.87 However, the 
court indicated that the plaintiffs may bring suits in Hong Kong or Tai-
wan, since both of them “adhere to” the Convention.88 The court’s use of 
the phrase “adhere to” erroneously suggests that Taiwan was a party to 
                                                                                                                         
Recent Development, United States-Taiwan Relations: New York Chinese TV Programs, Inv. 
v. U.E. Enterprises, Inc., No. 91-764, slip op. (2d Cir. Jan. 24, 1992), 33 Harv. Int’l. L.J. 631 
(1992). 
 82. Chang, 506 F. Supp. at 978 n.3.  
 83. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 63, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
 84. See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International 
Transportation by Air, art. 22, 28 Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter 
Warsaw Convention], for specific examples of how the Warsaw Convention limits liability 
and fora, respectively.  
 85. Atl. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Northwest Airlines, 796 F. Supp. 1188, 1191 (E.D. Wis. 
1992). 
 86. See id. at 1190 (“[A] High Contracting party is a state which is an original signa-
tory to the convention or one which ratified the convention or filed declarations of adherence 
to the convention after it went into force (citation omitted). Further, a declaration of adherence 
to the convention by a state may include colonies or territories of that state.”). 
 87. Lee v. China Airlines, Ltd., 669 F. Supp. 979, 980–82 (C.D. Cal. 1987). 
 88. Id. at 984. 
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the Warsaw Convention. Subsequently, in Atlantic Mutual Insurance 
Company, a court found the Warsaw Convention applicable because of 
the PRC’s declaration that the Convention applies to Taiwan, among 
other reasons.89  
For several reasons, the two district courts misapplied the laws. The 
courts ignored the TRA and the jurisprudence establishing that Taiwan’s 
status is not altered because of derecognition (and hence it should be 
treated as a separate entity from the PRC). The district courts’ decisions 
rest upon an erroneous presumption that the United States’ recognition 
of the PRC indicates the recognition of the PRC’s territorial claim to 
Taiwan.90 On the contrary, the court in Wong v. Ilchert clearly pointed 
out that the U.S.-PRC diplomatic relationship “does not necessarily en-
tail acceptance of one another’s territorial claim.” 91  As discussed 
previously, since the ROC and the PRC are separate States in the divided 
China, holding the ROC bound to treaties concluded by the PRC violates 
a basic premise of international law that “[a] treaty does not create either 
obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.”92  
Understanding the errors made by the district courts, the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Mingtai Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. 
UPS concluded that courts should defer to the executive branch’s deter-
mination that Taiwan should not be bound by the PRC’s adherence to 
the Warsaw Convention.93 The court pointed out that the U.S. govern-
ment confirmed the spirit of the TRA by listing China and Taiwan 
separately in Treaties in Force, published by the State Department.94 
This decision has had a profound impact in both US courts95 and foreign 
                                                                                                                         
 89. Atl. Mutual Ins. Co., 796 F. Supp. at 1191. For detailed discussions regarding these 
two cases, see Frank Chiang, State, Sovereignty, and Taiwan, 23 Fordham Int’l L.J. 959, 978–
80 (2000); Andy Y. Sun, Revisiting Taiwan’s Legal Status in the United States: The Impact of 
the Taiwan Relations Act on Private Disputes, 17 Chinese YB Int’l L. & Aff. 68, 72–74, 77–
81 (1998–99). 
 90. In re Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. AFS Cycle & Co., 190 B.R. 599, 611 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 1995) (“The reasoning in Atlantic Mutual was flawed. Its main error in the conclusory 
statement that the United States’ recognition of the People’s Republic of China means that the 
United States’ recognizes its territorial claim to the island of Taiwan.”). 
 91. Wong v. Ilchert, 998 F.2d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 92. Vienna Convention, supra note 83, art. 34. 
 93. Mingtai Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United Parcel Serv., 177 F.3d 1142, 1145–47 
(9th Cir. 1999); Eric Schwarz, Recent Decision, Mingtai Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. 
United Parcel Serv. & United Parcel Int’l., Inc., 177 F.3D 1142 (9th Cir. 1999), 13 N.Y. Int’l 
L. Rev. 133, 133 (2000).  
 94. Mingtai Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 177 F.3d at 1146 (“ ‘China’ is listed as a signatory 
to the Warsaw Convention, while ‘China (Taiwan)’ is not.”). 
 95. See, e.g., In re Air Crash at Taipei, Taiwan on October 31, 2000, 211 F.R.D. 374, 
380 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Mingtai Fire, 177 F.3d at 1146–47) (finding Annex 13 of the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation not applicable because Taiwan is not a party); 
Leenardo v. Singapore Airlines Ltd., 140 Fed. Appx. 661, 664 (2005) (citing Mingtai Fire, 
177 F.3d at 1145). 
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courts. As of now, German and Italian courts have found the Warsaw 
Convention inapplicable to shipments between Germany, Italy and Tai-
wan because the ROC on Taiwan is distinguishable from the PRC.96  
Because the United States and Taiwan have significant political and 
trade relationships, the number of judicial decisions by U.S. courts con-
cerning Taiwan’s sovereignty is the largest in the world, both before and 
after recognition. The TRA provides a comprehensive scheme under 
which the two nations maintain their ties to each other. Relying on the 
TRA, U.S. courts have established the principle that Taiwan is regarded 
as a State, and its immunities and other interests remained unscathed 
following derecognition.  
2. United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom does not have a statute similar to the Taiwan 
Relations Act. Instead, by basing judicial interpretations of Taiwan’s 
status on the common law, British courts have granted Taiwan State 
status, thus achieving the same result as the US courts achieved through 
interpreting the TRA. The United Kingdom was one of the first Western 
countries that switched recognition from the ROC to the PRC. In 1950, 
the United Kingdom formally extended recognition to the PRC, and si-
multaneously severed relations with the ROC on Taiwan.97 In 1972, the 
United Kingdom and the PRC signed the Joint Communique recognizing 
the PRC “as the sole legal government of China,” and subsequently re-
moved its official consulate in Taiwan.98  
                                                                                                                         
 96. See Landgericht Mönchengladbach (9 0 58/87) (Feb. 24, 1988), 1988 TRANSR 283 
(German); Fratelli v. Thai Airways, Alitalia, Tribunale di Naples, 23. 4. 1983 n. 2850, (1889) 
AIR L. 213 (Italian) Cf., cited in Zheng Huang, Theory and Practice of the International Air 
Carrier Liability Regime—A Critical Analysis of the Nagoya District Judgment on China 
Airlines B1816 Accident, Dec. 26, 2003, 2 Taiwan Int’l. L. Quarterly, 2 (2005) (questioning 
Japan’s Nagoya District Court’s decision that the Warsaw Convention applies to Taiwan when 
considering the crash of China Airlines B1816).  
 97. Françoise Mengin, A Function Relationship: Political Extension to Europe—
Taiwan Economic Ties, 169 China Q. 136, 137 (2002); Eberhard Sandschnieder, China’s 
Diplomatic Relations with the States of Europe, 169 China Q. 33, 35 (2002).  
 98. See 196 Pal. Deb., HC (6th ser.) (1991) 293, reprinted in [1991] 62 British Y.B. 
Int’l L. 568 (“As was set out in the 1972 Joint Communiqué with the [PRC], the British gov-
ernment recognize the Government of the [PRC] as the sole legal government of China, and 
acknowledges the position of the Chinese government that Taiwan is a province of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China.”); see also 238 Pal. Deb. (6th ser.) (1994) 936 reprinted in [1994] 65 
British Y.B. Int’l L. 589 (“In our view the status of Taiwan is a matter for Peking and Taipei 
to resolve between themselves.”); High Court Action No. 5805 of 1991: Questions by the 
Court about the Status of Taiwan, [1996] 67 British Y.B. Int’l L. 716–17 (Her majesty’s gov-
ernment does not recognize Taiwan or deal with the government in Taipei, there are only non-
official representative offices between the United Kingdom and Taiwan). The United King-
dom operates the non-official British Trade and Cultural Office in Taipei and its Taiwanese 
counterpart in London was established under the name, “Trade Representative Office.” Id. at 
717. 
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Since derecognition, the British courts have become a model for 
other common law jurisdictions on how to deal with the Taiwan ques-
tion. British courts established precedents as to foreign States that the 
executive branch does not recognize. The leading case is Carl Zeiss 
Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler, Ltd.,99 before the House of Lords. The piv-
otal issue was whether the plaintiff corporation, incorporated under the 
laws of the German Democratic Republic, had legal capacity to sue in 
British courts.100 At the time of suit, the British government did not rec-
ognize the German Democratic Republic. The defendant argued that the 
plaintiff corporation, as a “non-person,” lacked standing before British 
courts. Subsequently in a similar case, the Court of Appeals in GUR 
Corporations v. Trust Bank of America dealt with a similar standing is-
sue involving the Ciskei government in South Africa.101 The issue was 
that the British government did not recognize Ciskei because it was es-
tablished by South Africa during apartheid, also known as “separate 
development.”102  
In both cases, the British courts avoided the rule that courts are 
bound by the government’s policy to decline recognition to certain State-
like entities. In Carl Zeiss, the House of Lords held that since the United 
Kingdom still recognized the Soviet Union, the German Democratic 
Republic could be considered to be a “subordinate body” acting in the 
name of the Soviet Union.103 Following the same reasoning, in GUR 
Corporations, the court concluded that the acts of Ciskei were assumed 
to be those of South Africa, which the British government still 
recognized.104 Collectively, the cases established the Carl Zeiss doctrine, 
under which unrecognized States may be “recognized” for limited 
purposes.105  
The Carl Zeiss doctrine does not, and should not, apply to disputes 
involving Taiwan. In both Carl Zeiss and GUR Corporations, the courts 
                                                                                                                         
 99. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler, Ltd., [1967] 1 A.C. 853 (H.L.); see also 
Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments: An Analysis of the New British Policy and Prac-
tice, 63 British Y.B. Int’l L. 231, 248–61 (1992) (discussing English law regarding recognition 
of foreign states). 
 100. Ivan Shearer, International Legal Relations between Australia and Taiwan: Behind 
and Façade, 21 Australian Y.B. Int’l L 113, 125 (2000). See also Jochen Abr. Frowein, From 
Two to One—Germany and the United Nations, 46 German Y.B. Int’l L. 20, 22 (2003) (“The 
Three Western Powers . . . made it clear to the newly established German Government that it 
could not be recognized as the de jure government of all Germany, a position again formally 
upheld in the statement of the British Foreign Secretary in the famous Carl Zeiss case.”). 
 101. GUR Corp. v. Trust Bank of Africa, (1987) Q.B. 599 (Court of Appeal). 
 102. Shearer, supra note 100, at 126. 
 103. Carl Zeiss Stiftung, at 959.  
 104. GUR Corp., supra note 101. 
 105. See generally Alona E. Evans, Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena. 293 
F.Supp. 892., 63 Am. J. Int’l L. 636 (1969).  
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ruled that the acts of the unrecognized entities were assumed to be acts 
of States that the United Kingdom recognized. In both cases, the subor-
dinate States were “created on the initiative and with consent of” the 
parent States.106 Taiwan’s situation is different.107 The ROC was not cre-
ated by the PRC or established because of the PRC’s consent. Both the 
executive and legislative practice of the United Kingdom supports this 
view.  
While the British government “recognizes” the PRC as the only le-
gitimate government of China, similar to the position of the U.S. 
government, it simply “acknowledges” the PRC’s position that Taiwan 
is part of the PRC.108 The British government carefully chose the word 
“acknowledges,” which signifies no more than the statement that “we 
understand, although may not agree with, your position,” as opposed the 
word “recognizes,” which carries far greater legal implications. In addi-
tion, it is the long-standing practice of the British government, even in 
the absence of diplomatic relations, to recognize the “existence of Tai-
wanese authorities and their effective control over Taiwan.” 109  For 
instance, in March 1986, to ensure that British products be entitled to 
copyright protection in Taiwan under the reciprocal requirement of the 
ROC Copyright Law, the United Kingdom enacted an order granting 
Taiwanese products copyright protection.110 Recognition of Taiwanese 
law demonstrates the United Kingdom’s—at least limited—recognition 
of the ROC as the government of Taiwan.  
British courts are cognizant of Taiwan’s unique situation and have 
never applied the Carl Zeiss doctrine to cases involving Taiwan. The 
only common law court that applied the Carl Zeiss doctrine to Taiwan 
may be the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, Hong Kong’s Supreme 
Court after the takeover of the PRC in 1997.111 In the Chen Li Hung v. 
                                                                                                                         
 106. Shearer, supra note 100, at 126. 
 107. See id. (“The situation of the Republic of China (Taiwan) is historically and legally 
quite different.”); Talmon, supra note 99, at 259 n. 161 (“Especially as the Taiwanese authori-
ties cannot be regarded as a subordinate body or an agent set up by the entity which Her 
Majesty’s Government considers as entitled to exercise governing authority over the territory 
of Taiwan.”). 
 108. In the 1972 Joint Communique with the PRC, the British government recognizes 
the PRC government as the sole legal government of China, and acknowledges the position of 
the Chinese government that Taiwan is a province of the PRC. 196 Parl. Deb., H.C. (6th ser.) 
(1991) 293, reprinted in [1991] 62 British Y.B. Int’l L. 568. See Text of Joint Communique, 
Feb. 27, 1972 Dep’t St. Bull., Mar. 1972, 437 [hereinafter Shanghai Communique] (“The 
United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there 
is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.”). 
 109. Talmon, supra note 99, at 259 n. 161. 
 110. Id. at 259–60. 
 111. See Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s 
Republic of China art. 82 (“The power of final adjudication of the Hong Kong Special Admin-
istrative Region shall be vested in the Court of Final Appeal of the Region . . . .”).  
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Ting Lei Miao, the Court gave effect to a Taiwanese court’s bankruptcy 
order.112 The court stated that Taiwan is “under de jure sovereignty of” 
the PRC, but is currently “under the de facto albeit unlawful control of a 
usurper government.”113 It then opined that giving effect to the bank-
ruptcy order, which was made by “the usurper regime or courts in 
Taiwan,” would promote China’s reunification and was “necessary as a 
matter of common sense and justice.”114 The court’s reasoning should be 
read with caution however, given the fact that Hong Kong is now a spe-
cial administrative region of the PRC, and its courts’ judicial 
interpretations are confined by the PRC’s “one country, two systems” 
structure.115  
The first British case involving the ROC on Taiwan was also related 
to Hong Kong.116 Sitting in London and functioning as the court of last 
resort of Hong Kong before the Chinese takeover, the Privy Council117 
was asked to determine an appeal from the Supreme Court of Hong 
Kong. The issue was whether the ROC’s sale of 40 civil aircraft in Hong 
Kong to an American company, made on December 12, 1949, less than a 
month before the United Kingdom terminated diplomatic relations with 
the ROC on Taiwan, was still valid after derecognition. The defendant 
was the Central Air Transport Corporation (CATC), an ROC aircraft 
enterprise, which owned forty airplanes in Hong Kong. In November 
                                                                                                                         
 112. Chen Li Hung v. Ting Lei Miao, [2000] 3 H.K.C.F.A.R 9, 21 (C.F.A.). See Rong-
Chwan Chen, A Boat on a Troubled Strait: The Interregional Private Law of the Republic of 
China on Taiwan, 16 Wis. Int’l L.J. 599, 627–32 (1998) (introducing recognition of Taiwan 
and its judgment in Hong Kong courts); see also C.L. Lim, Non-Recognition of Putative For-
eign States (Taiwan) under Singapore’s State Immunity Act, 11 Asian Y.B. Int’L 3, 7 (2003–
04) (“[The case] may be seen recently to have chosen to follow the broad approach taken in 
Carl Zeiss and GUR.”). 
 113. Chen Li Hung v. Ting Lei Miao, [2000] 3 H.K.C.F.A.R. 9, 21 (C.F.A.) (emphasis 
in the original). 
 114. Id. at 21, 25. The Court also pointed out that, even China, under the Rules of the 
Supreme Court People’s Court passed on January 15, 1998, extends recognition to civil judg-
ments delivered in Taiwan. Id. at 19.  
 115. See Stephen J. Yates, Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule: Testimony before the East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee—Foreign Relations Committee—United States 
Senate, Heritage Foundation, July 1, 1999, available at http://www.heritage.org/research/  
asiaandthepacific/test070199.cfm. 
 116. Civil Air Transport, Inc. v. Central Air Transport Corp., [1953] AC 70 (P.C. 1952). 
See generally Paul Abel, Civil Air Transport Incorporated v. Central Air Transport Corpora-
tion, 2 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 136 (1953). 
 117. See generally Commonwealth Jurisdiction, available at http://www.privy-
council.org.uk/output/Page32.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 2008) (introducing the Privy Council’s 
jurisdiction). After 1997, Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal replaced the Privy Council as 
the highest court of appeal in Hong Kong. M. Lucy Tan, From the Privy Council to the Court 
of Final Appeal: Will the Area of Non-Justiciability be the Same in Hong Kong after July 1, 
1997?, 19 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L.R. 413, 414 (1997). 
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1949, most CATC employees defected to the communist government.118 
To avoid these aircrafts being taken by the PRC, the ROC government, 
which had by then retreated to Taiwan, sold them to a Delaware corpora-
tion formed by US citizens. 119  The American company sought a 
declaratory judgment that the aircrafts were its property. Since lower 
courts ruled against the company, finding that the sale was made “not in 
good faith . . . but for an alien and improper purpose,”120 and subse-
quently dismissed the company’s review request, the company appealed 
to the Privy Council.  
The Privy Council overruled the lower courts’ decisions and upheld 
the validity of the transaction at issue. The Privy Council found that, at 
the time of the sale, the ROC was recognized by the UK as the sole de 
jure government of China and, therefore, the validity of the ROC’s sales 
should not be reviewed by British courts. In particular, the Privy Council 
stressed that the lower court’s examination of whether the ROC govern-
ment was “alive to the probability of the withdrawal of recognition of 
[the British] government in the near future” was flawed because such 
consideration is “a matter of speculation.”121 Moreover, while retroactiv-
ity of recognition may validate acts of a de facto government, which 
later received recognition, it cannot “invalidate acts of the previous de 
jure government,” such as the ROC.122 The Privy Council’s decision in 
Civil Air Transport soon became significant international law precedent. 
When the US Congress debated the ownership of the ROC’s embassy 
property, which had been sold to a private association, the holding in 
Civil Air Transport played an important role in passing certain provi-
sions of the Taiwan Relations Act, which avoided the retroactive 
invalidation of the embassy sale.123  
                                                                                                                         
 118. See Civil Air Transport, [1953] A.C. 70 (“On Nov. 9, 1949, the then president of 
C.A.T.C., Mr. Chen flew from Hong Kong to Peking and transferred his allegiance to the de 
facto communist government. About the same time, the majority of C.A.T.C.’s employees in 
Hong Kong also defected from the nationalist government . . . .”). The PRC premier also de-
clared the aircraft to be property of new China and asked employees of the C.A.T.C. to stay in 
Hong Kong to “bear the responsibility of protecting the assets.” Id. 
 119. One of them is pro-Nationalist US General Claire Chennault, who went to China in 
WWII and became the commander of the American Volunteer Group, better known as the 
“Flying Tigers.” See, e.g. http://www.flyingtigersavg.com/tiger1.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 
2008). 
 120. Civil Air Transport, [1953] A.C. 70. 
 121. Id. This analysis is similar to the act of state doctrine in US courts.  
 122. Id; see also Guaranty Trust Co. v. U.S., 304 U.S. 126 (1938) (noting that recogni-
tion of a new government does not nullify earlier transactions made with a prior government); 
Gdynia Ameryka Linie v. Boguslawski, [1952] 2 All E.R. 470 (upholding a self-serving trans-
action by a soon-to-be unrecognized government). 
 123. See Taiwan Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. § 3301 (1979) (“The absence of diplomatic 
relations and recognition with respect to Taiwan shall not abrogate, infringe, modify, deny, or 
otherwise affect in any way any rights or obligations (including but not limited to those in-
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The court in Reel v. Holder again confronted sovereignty issues in-
volving Taiwan.124 The case concerned Taiwan’s membership in the 
International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF), an international ath-
letic association established in 1912 with its headquarters in the United 
Kingdom. The pivotal issue was the interpretation of Article I of the 
IAAF charter, which provides that “[o]nly one member for each country 
can be affiliated.”125 The All China Athletic Association in Beijing (PRC 
Association) was elected to be a member of the IAAF in 1954, and a 
similar association from Taiwan (ROC Association) was also admitted 
in 1956. Although the PRC Association withdrew its membership in 
1958 because of Taiwan’s accession, the IAAF passed a resolution in 
1978 accepting reification of the PRC Association and recognizing it as 
the only body governing both mainland China and Taiwan.126 The ROC 
Association sought a declaratory judgment regarding the validity of the 
resolution. The British courts were asked to determine whether Taiwan 
still retained its membership or if it was wrongfully excluded.  
The court first referred to other provisions of the IAAF Charter for 
guidance. According to the court, the IAAF Rule does not entertain the 
notion of “sovereign states in the international sense.”127 The member-
ship of an athletic association is valid if “it is the supreme athletic 
association for that territory and is not subject to any control by another 
athletic association.”128 The court further noted that the jurisdiction of an 
athletic association is confined by the “political boundaries of the coun-
try.”129 The court thus held that Taiwan and China are separate countries 
                                                                                                                         
volving contracts . . .) under the laws of the United States heretofore or hereafter acquired by 
or with respect to Taiwan.”) (emphasis added). From a military point of view, this case is even 
more crucial to the ROC’s retreated forces in Taiwan. The ROC government was greatly con-
cerned that if the PRC had gained control of the aircrafts, it would have immediately 
possessed the capability to attack Taiwan, which had no air-defense system. 
 124. Reel v. Holder, [1981] 3 All E.R. 321. 
 125. James Crawford, Decisions in British Courts during 1979 Involving Questions of 
Public or Private International Law 50 British Y.B. Int’l L. 217, 217 (1979). 
 126. See Reel, 3 All E.R. at 321. 
 127. Id. In particular, the court considered the following provisions. Article 7 provides 
that “[t]he National Governing Body for amateur athletics in any country shall be eligible for 
members of the Federation (emphasis added).” Article 9(7) further states that an affiliated 
member can be a “colony.” See id. at 322 (declaring that Taiwan could be a member of the 
International Badminton Federation and the decision did not involve international law or sov-
ereignty). 
 128. See id. at 321. 
 129. See id. at 325. (quoting Article 1(2)) (stipulating that “[t]he jurisdiction of members 
of the Federation shall be limited to the political boundaries of the country they represent.” 
The court opined that “if Wales formed their own independent amateur athletic association 
and wanted to be separately represented, . . . Wales would be a ‘country’ . . . under the rules of 
the IAAF.”) See Crawford, supra note 125, at 218 (“It is doubtful whether the boundary be-
tween, say, Wales and England could be described as ‘political’ . . . His Lordship did not 
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and, therefore, jurisdiction of one does not extend to the other. Thus, the 
IAAF’s resolution erroneously excluded Taiwan.130  
The British courts’ decisions are of great significance because, with-
out a statutory basis, the courts have used their common law analysis to 
achieve the same result that the TRA does in U.S. courts. By stating that 
the use of the word “country” or “national” in a statute does not exclude 
Taiwan, the court recognized that the ROC continued to exist on Taiwan 
despite derecognition. British courts also noted that the PRC and ROC 
are separate jurisdictions and that the two States should be therefore 
treated independently. This refutes the PRC’s claim that it has jurisdic-
tion over Taiwan.  
3. Canada 
Canada established formal relations with the PRC on October 13, 
1970, recognizing it as the sole legal government of China and “took 
note of” the PRC’s view that Taiwan is an “inalienable part of the terri-
tory” of the PRC.131 Again, the term “[took] note of” shows that the 
Canadian government never “recognized” the PRC’s territorial claim 
over Taiwan.132 The proposed “Taiwan Affairs Act,” which copied many 
sections from the Taiwan Relations Act, was introduced into Parliament 
and passed the first reading in 2006.133 However, due to the holding of 
                                                                                                                         
expressly consider whether the ‘boundary’ between Taiwan and the mainland could be de-
scribed as a ‘political’ one.”).  
 130. See Liang Ren-Guey v. Lake Placid 1980 Olympic Games, Inc., 49 N.Y.2d 771 
(1980) (holding that the question of whether a local International Olympic Committee should 
be allowed to display the ROC flag to be a political question beyond the court’s power to 
review). 
 131. Colin Mackerras & Amanda Yorke, The Cambridge Handbook of Contemporary 
China 152 (Cambridge 2001). 
 132. The Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs stated that “[o]ur position, . . . 
which was made clear to Chinese from the start of the negotiations, is that the Canadian Gov-
ernment does not consider it appropriate either to endorse or to challenge the Chinese 
Government’s position on the status of Taiwan.” L.C. Green, Representation versus Member-
ship: The Chinese Precedent in the United Nations, 10 Canadian Y.B. of Int’l L. 128–29 
(1972).  
 133. Jim Abbot, a member of Canada’s Conservative Party, introduced the Bill C-357 to 
provide “an improved framework for economic, trade, cultural and other initiatives between 
the people of Canada and the people of Taiwan.” Taiwan Affairs Bill Can Be Revived, avail-
able at http://taiwanjournal.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=21785&CtNode=122 (last visited Mar. 
23, 2008); see also Delegation of Canadian MPs Urged to Support Taiwan, Taipei Times, 
Sept. 20, 2005, at A1 (stating that Taiwan’s president “urged Canada to pass a law to legalize 
its unofficial with Taipei.”); China Fears for Passage of Taiwan Affairs Act by Canada Par-
liament, available at http://www.roc-taiwan.org/uk/TaiwanUpdate/nsl151005s.htm (reporting 
that China’s ambassador warned that the Act would damage China-Canada relations); Nancy 
Hughes Anthony, Canadian Chamber of Commerce, Letter to Members to Parliament, Aug. 
26, 2005 (arguing that passage of the bill would be harmful to Canada’s negotiations for 
tourism and investment agreements with China), available at http://www.chamber.ca/ 
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the general election, the bill, as with other legislative bills under consid-
eration, died on the order paper of the Congress.134 Canada’s judicial 
system is based both on British common law and on European civil 
law.135 Both of the two distinctive legal systems encountered the Taiwan 
question and, interestingly, ruled similarly.  
The first leading Canadian case involving the status of Taiwan was 
Romania v. Cheng, which went through the common law system.136 A 
vessel named Maersk Dubai that was registered in Taiwan arrived in 
Nova Scotia, Canada on May 24, 1996.137 Canadian police arrested the 
captain and crew, who were nationals of Taiwan, after learning that three 
Romanian stowaways were thrown overboard during two voyages from 
Spain to Canada. Romania charged the Taiwanese suspects with murder 
and, based on the Romania-Canada Extradition Treaty, requested that 
Canada extradite them to Romania.138 Taiwan applied to the Nova Scotia 
Supreme Court for permission to intervene in the case, arguing that un-
der international law, the case was under Taiwan’s jurisdiction because 
the alleged crimes were committed on the high seas and, as a flag State, 
Taiwan had exclusive jurisdiction over this subject matter.139 The PRC 
also asked for the suspects on the basis of its jurisdiction over Taiwan.140  
The court found that Canada was not obliged to extradite the 
Taiwanese suspects to Romania because the crimes were not committed 
within Romania’s jurisdiction or territory.141 It thus granted Taiwan 
jurisdiction over the case despite the lack of diplomatic relations 
                                                                                                                         
article.asp?id-181#letters (follow “Aug. 26, 2005 to Members of Parliament re: Bill C-357” 
hyperlink). 
 134. Taiwan Affairs Bill Can Be Revived, supra note 133. 
 135. Where Our Legal Systems Comes From, Canada’s System of Justice, available at 
http://www.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/just/03.html. 
 136. Romania v. Cheng [1997] N.S.R.2d 13, 45 (Can.), reprinted in 15 Chinese Y.B. 
Int’l L. & Aff. 111–140 (1996–97).  
 137. Hungdah Chiu et al., Transfer to the Republic of China of the Detainees Involved in 
the Maersk Dubai Case in Canada, in 15 Chinese Y.B. Int’l L. 103 (1996–97). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id.; see also Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts, Opphenheim’s International Law 
734 (9th ed. 1992) (“Jurisdiction on the high seas is thus dependent upon the maritime flag 
under which vessels sail. . .”). 
 140. Angeline G. Chen, Taiwan’s International Personality: Crossing the River by Feel-
ing the Stones, 20 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 223, 237–38 (1998). 
 141. Under the Extradition Act, Canada is obliged to extradite a “fugitive”—“a person 
being or suspected of being in Canada, who is accused or convicted of an extradition crime 
committed within the jurisdiction of a foreign state.” Transfer to the Republic of China of the 
Detainees Involved in the Maersk Dubai Case in Canada, 1996–97, 15 Chinese Y.B. Int’l L. 
115. Article I of the Canada-Romanian Treaty provides that “[t]he High Contracting parties 
engage to deliver up to each other those persons who, being accused or convicted of a crime 
or offense committed in the territory of one Party, shall be found within the territory of the 
other party, under the circumstances and conditions stated in the present treaty.” Id. at 124. 
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between Canada and Taiwan. 142  This case shows that Canada’s 
derecognition does not bar judicial cooperation with Taiwan. This 
principle was also confirmed outside Canada in a case where the Swiss 
Federal Supreme Court granted Taiwan judicial assistance.143 There, the 
court stressed that “[t]he absence of recognition and of diplomatic 
relations . . . does not mean that [such assistance] would be 
forbidden.”144  
Moreover, Canada’s civil law Quebec Superior Court in Parent v. 
Singapore Airlines affirmed Taiwan’s sovereign immunity based upon 
Canada’s State Immunity Act.145 The plaintiff in Parent brought action 
against Singapore Airlines (SAL) for injuries resulting from a crash in 
Taiwan. SAL, in turn, sued in warranty against Taiwan’s Civil Aeronau-
tics Administration (CAA), claiming that the CAA should be liable for 
the accident because of its mismanagement. The CAA argued that, as a 
government agency, it was entitled to immunity from the jurisdiction of 
Canadian courts. The court turned to Canada’s Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs, inquiring whether Taiwan was a foreign State.146 The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs replied that, pursuant to its one-China policy, Canada 
recognizes the PRC and has no diplomatic ties with Taiwan or the 
ROC.147 Despite the government’s reply, the court held that it was not 
the exclusive province of the executive branch to decide whether a for-
eign entity is a State under the State Immunity Act. The court found that 
Taiwan satisfied the criteria for statehood under the Montevideo Con-
vention. Additionally, it ruled that based on bilateral official dealings, 
the Canadian government in practice recognizes Taiwan’s “effective 
political independence.”148 Therefore, the court found that Taiwan was a 
                                                                                                                         
 142. Subsequently, the Canadian government transferred the suspects in custody to Tai-
wanese officials in Canada. Following the decision of the Canadian court, Taiwan’s 
Kaohsiung Public Prosecutors’ Office issued criminal summons for the suspects to appear 
before the prosecutors and subsequently indicted the captain. For information on the indict-
ments, see The Synopsis by the Prosecutor in the Maersk Dubai Case at the Kaohsiung 
District Court of Taiwan, Republic of China, 1998–99 Chinese Y.B. Int’l L. 105–134; see 
also 15 Chinese Y.B. Int’l L., supra note 141, at 109 (“The Canadian Government’s actions 
[are] in full accordance with International Law. There is no jurisdiction for Canadian courts 
under either Canadian or International Law.”). 
 143. See generally Marc Henzelin, Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between Swit-
zerland and Taiwan: The Andrew and others Case, 3 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 790 (2005). 
 144. Tribunal Fédéral [Federal Court] May 3, 2004, 130 Arrêts du Tribunal Fédéral 
Suisse II 217 (Switz.), translated in Henzelin, supra note 143, at 793.  
 145. Parent v. Singapore Airlines Ltd., [2003] R.J.Q. 1330.  
 146. Olufemi A. Elias, The International Status of Taiwan in the Court of Canada and 
Singapore, 2004 Sing. Y.B. Int’l L. 94. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 95.  
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“foreign state” within the meaning of the State Immunity Act and dis-
missed the SAL’s action in warranty.149 
4. Japan 
Japan’s legal system is modeled after European civil law.150 Japan 
did not enact a statute similar to the Taiwan Relations Act nor does it 
consider common law rulings to be of precedential value. Nonetheless, 
similar to their counterparts in the United States, the United Kingdom 
and Canada, Japanese courts have accorded Taiwan State status in spite 
of derecognition.  
After World War II, the ROC concluded the Peace Treaty with Ja-
pan restoring diplomatic relations between the two nations. This treaty 
was nullified in 1972 when Japan signed the Joint Communique with the 
PRC recognizing the Beijing government as China’s sole legitimate 
government.151 The most significant Japanese case involving Taiwan is 
Republic of China v. Yu Ping-huan, commonly known as the Kokaryo 
case. This case involved the title of the Kokaryo dormitory for Chinese 
students. During World War II, Kyoto University rented the property for 
Chinese students. The ROC purchased it in 1952 for the same purpose.152 
After Japan’s recognition of the PRC in 1972, pro-Beijing students oc-
cupied the dormitory, which caused the ROC government to file a 
lawsuit demanding that the students leave the premises. The case soon 
became one of the most prominent cases concerning State succession in 
                                                                                                                         
 149. It is worth noting that in a similar case, Singapore’s Ministry Foreign Affairs de-
clined to issue a certificate addressing the issue whether Taiwan was a foreign state for 
statutory purposes. The courts held that whether or not a foreign entity is entitled to sovereign 
immunity was “within the exclusive province of the executive.” Woo Anthony v. Singapore 
Airlines Ltd. and other actions, [2003] 3 S.G.H.C. 688, para. 22, available at 
http://www.singaporelaw.ng/rss/judg/28602.html. As the government’s position as to Tai-
wan’s status was vague and inconclusive, the court ruled that Taiwan was not a foreign state 
within the meaning of Singapore’s State Immunity Act of 1985. It is interesting to observe 
that both courts in Singapore and Canada followed “the one voice doctrine” under which the 
court should defer to the executive branch as to recognition, but ruled differently. See Elias, 
supra note 146, at 96–97 (detailing the case). The Singaporean court not only misinterpreted 
“no voice,” i.e. the government’s silence on the status of Taiwan, as “a voice,” but also failed 
to consider Singapore’s other official dealings with Taiwan. See also Lim, supra note 112, at 
10 (“The learned judge added that the suggestion that de facto recognition is of ‘equal impor-
tance’ for the purposes of the Act may also be something of ‘an exaggerated idea.’ ”). 
 150. Japan is “modeled after German civil law system with English-American influ-
ence.” CIA World Factbook, Field Listing—Legal System, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2100.html (last visited May 7, 2008). 
 151. Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the People’s Republic of 
China, Point 2, Sept. 29, 1972, M.O.F.A. Pursuant to the Communique, Japan continues 
“working relations with Taiwan on a non-governmental basis.” The Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs Japan, Diplomatic Bluebook 2006, 47 (2006). 
 152. X. v. Taiwan (Republic of China), 31 Japanese Annual Int’l. L. 201 (Osaka High 
Ct., Feb. 26, 1987).  
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Japan and abroad. Japanese courts were asked to determine two issues 
regarding the two Chinas. First, after Japan’s derecognition of the ROC, 
did the ROC still have the capacity to sue in Japanese courts? Second, 
should the PRC, the government that Japan recognizes, succeed owner-
ship of the property purchased by the ROC? 
On the standing issue, the Kyoto District Court in 1977 dismissed 
the case. It ruled that since Japan switched recognition to the PRC, the 
ROC government in Taiwan possessed no right to protect the property at 
issue in Japan.153 The district court’s decision was overruled by the 
Osaka High Court, which found that the ROC had the capacity to be a 
party to the suit. The court noted trade relations between Taiwan and 
Japan and found that it would be “most reasonable” to admit Taiwan’s 
standing in private legal disputes.154 Furthermore, in the court’s view, 
recognizing Taiwan’s standing to bring suit does not hinder the govern-
ment’s recognition of the PRC.155 The case was then remanded to the 
district court. 
In 1986, the Kyoto District Court found that, since the ROC still 
dominates Taiwan, Japan’s recognition of the PRC “followed an incom-
plete succession of government.”156 Thus the ROC kept its property right 
to the dormitory and was entitled to exercise that right in Japan. The 
Osaka High Court reaffirmed this decision and elaborated further on the 
theory of “incomplete succession.” The court explained that under this 
theory, the old government’s assets abroad are “not necessarily suc-
ceeded to the new government, for the latter does not dominate them 
while the former still exists.”157 The court also found that while the as-
sets abroad “representing the country” or being “used for the exercise of 
state powers” should succeed to the new government upon the change of 
recognition, other assets should be retained by the old government.158 
Considering the fact that the ROC, as the old government, still effi-
ciently controls Taiwan and adjacent islands, and that the dormitory was 
not a “diplomatic asset,” the court concluded that despite the switch of 
recognition, the ROC “has not lost the ownership right to the prop-
erty.”159 Subsequently, the PRC filed an appeal to the Japanese Supreme 
                                                                                                                         
 153. See generally Republic of China v. Yu Ping-huan, 22 Japanese Annual Int’l L. 
151–56 (Kyoto Dist. Ct., Sept. 16, 1977). 
 154. Republic of China v. Yu Ping-huan, 33 Japanese Annual Int’l L. 186 (Kyoto Dist. 
Ct., Apr. 13, 1982). 
 155. Id.  
 156. Republic of China v. Yu Ping-huan, 33 Japanese Annual Int’l L. 188 (Kyoto Dist. 
Ct., Feb. 4, 1986). 
 157. See Chinese Y.B. of Int’l. L. and Aff., vol. 11 (1991–92) at 249, para. 3.  
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. at para 1.  
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Court in 1987. At this point, the Supreme Court has not heard or dis-
missed the case.160 
The procedural decision recognizing the ROC’s capacity to sue is in 
line with case law in the other jurisdictions discussed above. More le-
gally interesting is the courts’ substantive decision about the ROC’s title 
over the Kokaryo dormitory and the Japanese courts’ application of the 
innovative theory of “incomplete succession.” Upholding the ROC’s 
property title, Japanese courts refuted the PRC’s claim that it replaced 
the ROC under international law.161 Beijing heavily attacked the Ko-
karyo case as violating the Japan-PRC Joint Communique, which 
recognizes the PRC as the only de jure government of China.162 The 
PRC’s position is flawed, however, because in the Joint Communique, 
Japan simply “understands and respects,” rather than “recognizes,” the 
PRC’s territorial claim over Taiwan.163 Hence, the Kokaryo case reaf-
firms that the ROC’s State status was not altered as a result of 
derecognition. 
B. Emerging Customary International Law 
Based on the foregoing cases, I argue that treating the ROC on Tai-
wan as a distinct State for purposes of judicial proceedings has risen to 
the level of customary international law. This creates a binding effect on 
domestic and international courts. Customary international law is con-
sidered to be “the oldest and the original source of international law.”164 
According to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Jus-
tice, the ICJ is bound to apply “international custom, as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law” when deciding issues of international 
law.165 Evidence of custom is demonstrated by showing two essential 
elements: 1) generality of the State practice and 2) Opinio Juris.166  
                                                                                                                         
 160. Jianming Shen, Revisiting the Disability of the Non-Recognized in the Courts of the 
Non-Recognizing States and Beyond: The Departure of the In Re Guanhua Liao Courts From 
the Rules, 5 Fla. Int’l J. 401, 411 (1990).  
 161. See Taiwan Issues, Core of Sino-Japanese Relations: Experts, People’s Daily, Aug. 
5, 2002, available at http://English.peopledaily.com.cn/200208/05/eng/20020805_ 
100916.shtml (stating that the PRC replaced the ROC in 1949 and the PRC “is the only sover-
eign state representing China”).  
 162. See Shen, supra note 160, at 412 (arguing that due to treaties concluded between 
the PRC and Japan, Taiwan lost all international rights that a government enjoys). 
 163. Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the People’s Republic of 
China, Point 3, Sept. 29, 1972, M.O.F.A. 
 164. Jennings & Watts, supra note 139, at 25. 
 165. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38.1, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter the ICJ Statute] (“The Court, whose function is to decide 
in accordance with international law such disputes as are subsumed to it, shall apply: . . . (b) 
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law . . . .”). 
 166. Jennings & Watts, supra note 139, at 27. 
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To satisfy the generality of the State practice, the conduct of States 
should be regular and consistent.167 In the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, the 
ICJ found that a 12-mile fishery zone limit had become “generally ac-
cepted” and “an increasing and widespread acceptance of the concept of 
preferential rights for coastal states.”168 Similarly, the practice in most 
major countries demonstrates that treating Taiwan as a State independent 
of the PRC has been widely accepted. While the governments recognize 
the PRC as the government of China, they never concede that Taiwan 
belongs to the PRC. Instead, the United States and the United Kingdom 
“acknowledge,” Canada “takes note of,” and Japan “understands and 
respects” the PRC’s territorial claim over Taiwan. They carefully chose 
these non-legally-binding phrases to avoid downgrading the ROC’s State 
status and to maintain the same level of substantive, albeit unofficial, 
relations with Taiwan. The recognition of Taiwan’s de facto independ-
ence is even more significant from a judicial perspective. Courts across 
the world deem Taiwan to be a State in judicial proceedings.  
Some contend that some governments and courts still hold the view 
that the PRC has jurisdiction over Taiwan. In my view, that position ig-
nores that, to form a custom, the practice of states does not have to be 
“in absolutely rigorous conformity.”169 International law requires that the 
practice of countries “whose interests are specially affected” be “exten-
sive and virtually uniform.”170 The United States, the United Kingdom, 
Canada, and Japan certainly qualify as countries whose interests are spe-
cially affected, given that they are major trading partners with both 
China and Taiwan, and are consistently concerned about political situa-
tions across the Taiwan Strait.  
As for opinio juris, the statute of the ICJ requires the general prac-
tice to be “accepted as law” by States. Ian Brownlie defines opinio juris 
as a “sense of legal obligation,” distinct from “motives of courtesy, fair-
ness, or morality.”171 This legal obligation is exemplified by a US court’s 
decision stating that it is obliged to apply law to Taiwan as if it were 
recognized.172 Moreover, courts in the United States, Canada, and Swit-
zerland explicitly pointed out that Taiwan met the criteria for statehood 
                                                                                                                         
 167. See Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J 266, 276 (Nov. 20). The ICJ in 
the Asylum case also emphasized the necessity for constancy and uniformity of usages or 
practices before they can be recognized as custom. 
 168. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. & N. Ir. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 23–26 (July 25). 
 169. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 98 n.186 (June 
27). 
 170. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger./Den.; W. Ger./Neth.), 1969 ICJ Rep. 3 
(Judgment of Feb. 20), reprinted in 8 ILM 340 (1969).  
 171. Brownlie, supra note 1, at 8. 
 172. Dupont Circle Citizens Ass’n. v. D.C. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 530 A.2d 1163, 
1170 (D.C. 1987). 
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under the Montevideo Convention, and that the absence of recognition 
does not diminish Taiwan’s status as a nation.173 This finding demon-
strates that courts feel they are legally obligated to treat Taiwan as a 
State. In turn, this finding buttresses the theory that the ROC and the 
PRC are divided States under international law. Since recognition of 
Taiwan as a foreign State satisfies two prongs under Article 38 of the 
ICJ Statute, i.e. State practice and opinio juris, the judicial recognition of 
Taiwan’s status should be considered an established international cus-
tom. Indeed, no territory in the world should be left in a judicial vacuum. 
As Judge Golcuklu pointed out at the European Court of Human Rights, 
regardless of the name or classification of the country, “[w]ho today 
would deny the existence of Taiwan?”174 
III. Taiwan’s Standing Before International Courts 
A. Practice of International Courts 
The practice of foreign courts in various legally significant jurisdic-
tions shows that Taiwan should be considered a State in judicial 
proceedings. Further, this judicial recognition has risen to the level of 
international custom with which international courts are bound to com-
ply. The following sections examine how international courts deal with 
the Taiwan question; that is, how Taiwan can access to courts in interna-
tional settings to resolve disputes. They assess, in turn, Taiwan’s 
standing before the International Court of Justice as a non-UN Member 
State; the possibility of bringing a case before the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea; and whether Taiwan can utilize the WTO dispute 
settlement system. 
1. International Court of Justice 
The International Court of Justice is the “principle judicial organ of 
the United Nations.” 175 After World War I, nations devastated by the 
                                                                                                                         
 173. See N.Y. Chinese TV Programs v. U.E. Enterprises, Inc., 954 F.2d 847, 853 (2d 
Cir. 1991)(discussing the criteria for a nation and holding that the absence of derecognition 
does not alter Taiwan’s status as a nation); Parent Singapore Airlines Ltd., [2003] R.J.Q. 
1330(“[Taiwan] easily passes all the traditional tests of international law. The conclusion is 
reached that by international law Formosa has achieved statehood.”); Tribunal Fédéral [Fed-
eral Court] May 3, 2004, 130 Arrêts du Tribunal Fédéral Suisse II 217 (Switz.) (finding that 
Taiwan meets the criteria under the Montevideo Convention). 
 174. Loizidou v. Turkey 89 Eur. Ct. of H.R. (15318), paras. 148, 149, and 174 (1996). 
 175. UN Charter art. 92 provides: 
The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations. It shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based 
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war decided to establish a peace resolution mechanism to safeguard 
long-standing harmony in the world. The Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice (PCIJ) was established under the auspices of the League of 
Nations. After World War II, recognizing that the world community 
needed a more law-oriented, rather than power-oriented, judicial institu-
tion, countries around the globe, including China (represented by the 
ROC government), signed the United Nations Charter in which they re-
placed the PCIJ with the ICJ. Since its first decision in 1946, Corfu 
Channel,176 the ICJ’s decisions and advisory opinions have significantly 
clarified international law principles and elaborated upon States’ duties 
and responsibilities.177 Therefore, whether or not Taiwan is able to have 
access to the ICJ to resolve international disputes is of great importance 
to the country.  
a. Jurisdiction 
The ICJ’s jurisdiction is based on the consent of the parties. A State 
is able to consent to the ICJ jurisdiction by special agreement, by treaties 
and conventions, or by the recognition of the Court’s compulsory juris-
diction. The legal basis of the ICJ’s jurisdiction is contained in Article 
36 of the ICJ Statute. According to Article 36(1), the Court’s jurisdiction 
includes all cases referred by State parties, usually in the form of special 
agreement for the specific purpose of submitting the dispute and indicat-
ing the subject of the dispute as well as the parties involved.178 In my 
view, the ICJ should have jurisdiction over cases regarding Taiwan, de-
spite the fact that the country is not a party to the ICJ Statute. Based on 
Article 36(1) of the ICJ Statute, Taiwan may accept the ICJ’s jurisdic-
tion by concluding treaties or conventions that require that disputes that 
arise from those agreements to be subject to the ICJ’s jurisdiction.179 
Provisions of two treaties that Taiwan concluded, Article XXVIII of the 
                                                                                                                         
upon the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and forms an inte-
gral part of the present Charter. 
 176. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (April 9)(involving Albania’s state 
responsibility for the explosion of mines and resulting damage to British property in territorial 
waters, where Albania knew of the mine at issue. 
 177. Since 1946, the ICJ has issued 92 judgments and 25 advisory opinions. The Interna-
tional Court of Justice, Nov. 23, 2006, available at http://www.icj.cig.org/icjwww7 
igeneralinformation.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2008).  
 178. See ICJ Statute, supra note 165, at art. 36(1) (“[T]he Court comprises all cases 
which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United 
Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.”). 
 179. See Basis of the Court’s Jurisdiction, http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/ 
index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=2(last visited Mar. 23, 2008) (“Such cases normally come before 
the Court by notification to the Registry of an agreement known as a special agreement and 
concluded by the parties specially for this purpose.”). 
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1946 ROC-U.S. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN 
Treaty) and Article 2 of the 1947 ROC-Philippines Treaty of Amity, 
confer jurisdiction over bilateral disputes on the ICJ.180 Although the 
Treaty of Amity may have been rescinded because of derecognition of 
the ROC by the Philippines, both U.S. and Taiwanese courts have con-
sistently recognized the validity of the ROC-U.S. FCN Treaty.181 Thus, 
the FCN Treaty, which meets the requirement of “treaties and conven-
tions in force” under Article 36(1) of the ICJ Statute, may enable Taiwan 
to resort to the ICJ.  
The other way of conferring jurisdiction on the ICJ is based upon on 
Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute under which a State may accept the 
Court’s compulsory jurisdiction.182 Yet, to resort to this provision, Tai-
wan must first become a party to the ICJ Statute. In theory, it is possible 
for a non-UN member to be a party to the ICJ Statute under Article 93(2) 
of the UN Charter.183 In 1946, the UN General Assembly passed Resolu-
tion 91(I), requiring Switzerland to meet certain conditions to become a 
party to the ICJ Statute.184 However, Taiwan would face political obsta-
cles should it follow Switzerland’s approach. Under Article 93(2) of the 
UN Charter, Taiwan’s accession to the ICJ would have to be decided by 
the UN General Assembly on the Security Council’s recommendation. 
Since the PRC, as a permanent member of the Security Council, pos-
sesses veto power, it is difficult to envision the PRC acquiescing to 
Taiwan’s attempts to become party to the ICJ Statute, particularly given 
                                                                                                                         
 180. Treaty of Amity, China–Phil., art. II, Apr. 18, 1947, 175 U.N.T.S. 364; Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the Repub-
lic of China, U.S.–R.O.C, art. XXVIII, Nov. 4, 1946, 25 U.N.T.S 233. See also International 
Court of Justice, Jurisdiction, http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2= 
1&p3=4 (“All entries recorded throughout this Section in respect of China . . . are to be under-
stood in the light of General Assembly resolution 2758 (XXVI) of 25 October 1971.”). 
 181. See generally Chang v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 506 F.Supp. 975 (N.D. 
Ill. 1980); N.Y. Chinese TV Programs, Inc. v. U.E. Enterprises, 954 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1992). 
See Connie Guang-Hwa Yang, WTO System and Dispute Settlement, Lecture at the World 
Trade Law Association First Asian-Pacific Regional Conference (Oct. 18, 2003), available at 
http://www.tradelaw.nccu.edu.tw/ebook/World%20Trade%20Law%20Association_First%20
Asian-Pacific%20Regional%20Conference_1.pdf (stating that according to the ROC-US FCN 
Treaty, Taiwanese courts in 1984, 1985, and 1990 consistently granted US companies stand-
ing in copyright cases). 
 182. See ICJ Statute, supra note 165, at art. 36(2). 
 183. See U.N Charter, supra note 175, at art. 93(2) (stating that a non-UN Member State 
may become a party to the ICJ Statute “on conditions to be determined in each case by the 
General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.”). For instance, Swit-
zerland and Lichtenstein became parties to the ICJ Statute and participated in the Interhandel 
Case and the Nottebohm Case, respectively, before they joined the United Nations.  
 184. G.A. Res. 91(I), (Dec. 11, 1946) (The UN General Assembly required Switzerland 
to (1) accept provisions of the ICJ Statute; 2) accept obligations of a Member of the United 
Nations under Article 94 of the Charter; and (3) undertake to contribute to the Court’s ex-
penses).  
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the PRC’s longstanding position against resolving cross-strait “domestic 
disputes” in international settings.  
b. Standing for a Non-UN Member 
If Taiwan is able to overcome the jurisdiction threshold, it faces a 
much thornier challenge before it can resort to the ICJ: obtaining stand-
ing before the Court. A State needs to be a party to the ICJ Statute in 
order to try cases before the ICJ. However, as discussed above, it is un-
likely that Taiwan would become a party to the ICJ Statute because of 
Chinese pressure. As a result, the fundamental legal knot that Taiwan 
has to untie is whether the country, which is not a UN member or a party 
to the ICJ Statute, can have its day in court. Strictly legally speaking, the 
problem may not be an insurmountable obstacle.  
According to Article 35(2) of the ICJ Statute, the Court is open to 
States that are not party to the ICJ Statute (and likely not UN-members) 
subject to conditions determined by the Security Council.185 According 
to Resolution 9, adopted by the Security Council in 1946, a State may 
deposit a declaration with the ICJ accepting its jurisdiction if it indicates 
that it would comply with the Court’s decisions and obligations under 
the UN Charter.186 It should be noted that this procedure under Article 
35(2) of the ICJ Statute and Resolution 9 of the Security Council is dis-
tinguishable from the procedure pursuant to Article 93(2) of the UN 
Charter and Resolution 91(I) of the General Assembly. Under the former 
procedure, Taiwan’s accession to the Court would be decided by the ICJ 
alone. Under the latter procedure, whether Taiwan can become a party to 
the ICJ Statute hinges upon the decision of the General Assembly, a po-
litical forum where Taiwan has fewer than 30 diplomatic allies.  
Therefore, the most plausible legal basis for Taiwan to gain standing 
before the ICJ may be Article 35(2) of the ICJ Statute and Resolution 9 
of the Security Council. The ICJ has never rejected any State’s jurisdic-
tion declaration. If Taiwan complies with the conditions set forth in the 
Resolution, such as depositing a declaration with the ICJ accepting its 
jurisdiction, the ICJ may consider the worldwide judicial recognition of 
Taiwan as a State and grant the nation standing before the court. The 
case of Taiwan has never been tested. It should be noted that the coun-
try’s attempt to file a declaration accepting the ICJ’s jurisdiction may 
involve the substantial political risk of losing a case in the ICJ. It is true 
that if it prevails, the ROC will effectively claim its independent state-
hood because, according to the ICJ Statute, only States can make such a 
                                                                                                                         
 185. See ICJ Statute, supra note 165 at art. 35(2) (“The conditions under which the 
Court shall be open to other states shall . . . be laid down by the Security Council . . . .”). 
 186. See S.C. Res. 9 (Oct. 15, 1946).  
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declaration. However, if the Court rules against Taiwan, the country’s 
statehood will be largely undermined because other judicial bodies will 
most likely follow the ICJ’s precedent.  
2. International Tribunal for the Law of Sea 
It is important to understand that the stringent State requirements of 
the International Court of Justice may exclude some States, such as Tai-
wan, whose international status is disputed. Because this would 
undermine the effect of a sound judicial system, a new movement to 
broaden the scope of access to judicial proceedings has emerged among 
international tribunals. Evidence of this trend is the establishment of the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS, or Tribunal), 
which was created under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea. Distinct from the ICJ, whose access is limited to State parties,187 the 
ITLOS is more widely open to “entities” that “confer jurisdiction on the 
Tribunal.”188 For instance, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
provides that with respect to seabed disputes, the Convention should ap-
ply “mutatis mutandis” to entities other than State Parties.189 Taiwan, as 
a maritime power which possesses the world’s seventh-largest fishing 
fleet,190 needs a mechanism to resolve sea disputes. This is important not 
only for Taiwan but for other nations who may have disputes with Tai-
wan.191 Even though Taiwan is not a party to the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, as a “fishing entity,” it has the right to have access to the 
Tribunal. 
a. Fishing Entity 
The term “fishing entity” is a unique concept under international 
law. This term specifically applies to Taiwan, and the concept provides a 
legal basis for Taiwan to bring suits before the ITLOS. The term first 
appeared in the text of the 1995 UN Fish Stock Agreement (UN Fish 
                                                                                                                         
 187. ICJ Statute, supra note 165, at art. 35.1 (“The Court shall be open to the states 
parties to the present Statute.”). 
 188. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, at Annex VI, art. 20, paras. 1 
and 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (Dec. 10, 1982)(Statute of the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea) [hereinafter “ITLOS Statute” or “ITLOS”]. 
 189. Id. at art. 285 (“This section applies to any dispute which pursuant to Part XI, sec-
tion 5, is to be settled in accordance with procedures provided for in this Part. If an entity 
other than a State Party is a party to such a dispute, this section applies mutatis mutandis.”). 
 190. International Boat Industry, Key Market Facts: Taiwan—Background Market Data, 
available at http://www.ibinews.com/ibinews/key_mkt_facts/key_info_taiwan.htm (last vis-
ited Nov. 19, 2007).  
 191. See generally Alan E. Boyle, Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion: Problems of Fragmentation and Jurisdiction, 46 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 37 (1997). 
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Stock Agreement).192 The major goal of this Agreement is to enforce the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and to “ensure the long-term con-
servation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks.”193 As of the beginning of 2007, there are 59 sig-
natories to the UN Fish Stock Agreement.194 While the Agreement 
primarily governs State Parties, 195  Article 1(3) provides that “this 
Agreement applies mutatis mutandis to other fishing entities whose ves-
sels fish on the high seas.”196 Article 17(3) further details the obligations 
of “fishing entities.”197 Since then, the term “fishing entities” has fre-
quently appeared in other international fishery agreements.198 Moreover, 
the ITLOS stressed in the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases that the countries 
involved should “make further efforts to reach agreement with other 
States and fishing entities” in order to preserve fishing stocks.199  
The question of to whom the term “fishing entities” refers should 
trace back to the drafting history of the UN Fish Stock Agreement. No 
legislative material specifically explains the definition of fishing entities. 
Nonetheless, at a conference in 1996, Poland inquired as to what the 
concept of “fishing entities” meant. The chairman responded that it is “a 
particular reference to the status of China.”200 Moritaka Hayashi, the 
                                                                                                                         
 192. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for signa-
ture Dec. 4, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1542 [hereinafter Fish Stock Agreement]. 
 193. Id. at 1547. 
 194. See Oceans and Law of the Sea, Overview on the United Nations Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 
10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/ 
convention_agreements/convention_overview_fish_stocks.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2007).  
 195. Fish Stock Agreement, supra note 192, at art.1, sec. 2(a) (“ ‘States Parties’ means 
States which have consented to be bound by this Agreement and for which the Agreement is 
in force.”). 
 196. Id.  
 197. Id. at art. 17, para. 3 (“States which are members of a subregional or regional fish-
eries management organization . . . shall . . . request the fishing entities . . . . Such fishing 
entities shall enjoy benefits . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 198. See, e.g., Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, art. 9(2), Sept. 5, 2000, 2000 A.T.N.I.F. 
11 (“A fishing entity referred to in the Agreement . . . .”); Convention on the Conservation 
and Management of Fishery Resources in the South-East Atlantic Ocean, art. 1(i), Aug. 31, 
2002, 2002 O.J. (L/234/40) (EC) (“ ‘[F]ishing entity’ means any fishing entity referred to in 
Article 1(3) of the 1995 Agreement . . . .”). 
 199. Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, (N.Z. v. Japan; Aust’l. v. Japan), 38 I.L.M. 1624 at 
para. 90 [hereinafter Int’l. Trib. L. of the Sea 1999] (concerning requests from Australia and 
New Zealand for provisional measures against Japan’s over fishing of southern bluefin tuna).  
 200. Song Yahhui, A Refutation of the CCP rational denying Taiwanese Participation in 
the WHO (Feb 2003), http:www.csil.org.tw/bbs/Forum200302.pdf. The chairman was Am-
bassador Statya Nandam of Fiji. Id. 
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former director of the UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the 
Sea, pointed out that the term “fishing entity” refers to Taiwan.201 This 
explanation is also widely supported within academia.202 In addition, it is 
noteworthy that even the PRC did not raise objections in the process of 
enacting the UN Fish Stock Agreement, in which the term “fishing enti-
ties” first appeared. China’s silence, to some extent, also indicates its 
acquiescence to the concept of fishing entities. In my view, the reason 
for creating the special category for Taiwan reflects a reluctant political 
compromise between China’s pressure and other nations’ desire to in-
corporate Taiwan, a major fishing State, into global regulations.  
b. Access to the Tribunal 
The notion of Taiwan being a fishing entity is well accepted by the 
international community. Relying on its status as a fishing entity, Tai-
wan is entitled to access the ITLOS through the dispute settlement 
provisions of the international fishery agreements. In 2000, Taiwan, as a 
fishing entity, joined the Commission established under the Convention 
on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO Convention).203 The 
WCPO Convention states that one of the major purposes of the Commis-
sion is to “promote the peaceful settlement of disputes.”204 It further 
provides that the dispute settlement mechanism of the UN Fish Stock 
Agreement, which grants access to the ITLOS, should apply to disputes 
                                                                                                                         
 201. Moritaka Hayashi, The 1995 Agreement on the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: Significance for the Law of the Sea Convention, 
29 Ocean & Coastal J. 51, 59 (1995); see also Ronald Barton, The Law of the Sea and Re-
gional Fisheries Organizations, 14 Int’l J. Mar. & Coastal L. 333, 351 (1999). 
 202. See David H. Anderson, The Straddling Stocks Agreement of 1995—An Initial As-
sessment, 45 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 463, 463–75 (1996); David A. Balton, Strengthening the 
Law of the Sea: The New Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks, 27 Ocean Development & Int’l L., 125, 125–51 (1996); see also Sean D. Murphy, 
Conservation of Fish in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 152, 153 
(2001) (stating that Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean includes “fishing entities” in order to 
cover Taiwan). 
 203. See Internet Guide to International Fisheries Law, Commission for the Conserva-
tion and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific 
Ocean, http://www.intfish.plus.com/orgs/fisheries/wcpfc.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2007) (“The 
Commission also provides for participation by fishing entities, which is enabled by means of 
an Arrangement for the Participation of Fishing Entities (which was signed by Chinese Taipei 
on 5 September 2000).”). The western and central Pacific Ocean is an area where Taiwan 
catches a significant amount of fish catch and, hence, Taiwan’s participation is vital to meet 
the goal of the WCPO Convention. 
 204. Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean art. 10, §1(n), Sept. 5, 2000, S. Treaty Doc. No. 
109-1 (2005), 40 I.L.M. 278, available at http://www.intfish.plus.com/treaties/westpac.htm. 
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among members of the Commission.205 Taiwan may take advantage of 
this process even though it is currently unable to be a party to the UN 
Fish Stock Agreement.  
In August 2002, Taiwan became a member of the Extended Com-
mission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna as a fishing 
entity.206 The Extended Commission’s resolution provides that disputes 
should be resolved by “arbitration or other peaceful means.”207 Taiwan is 
also poised to join the Antigua Convention208 through a similar arrange-
ment – as a fishing entity under the name of Chinese Taipei.209 The 
Antigua Convention also provides that members are obliged to resolve 
disputes through “peaceful means” consistent with international law.210  
 A reasonable interpretation of the term “peaceful means” contained 
in the foregoing agreements cannot preclude resolving conflicts before 
the ITLOS, the judicial forum recognized to be the most authoritative in 
maritime affairs. Thus, Taiwan in its capacity as a fishing entity may 
rely on the following provisions. Article 288 of the UN Convention for 
the Law of Sea provides that the ITLOS is entitled to jurisdiction over 
disputes arising from “an international agreement related to the pur-
poses of this Convention.”211 Article 20 of the ITLOS Statute also 
permits an entity “other than State Parties” to have access to the Tribunal 
“pursuant to any other agreement conferring jurisdiction.”212 Article 21 
of the same Statute further states that the jurisdiction of the ITLOS com-
                                                                                                                         
 205. Id. at art. 31 (“The provisions relating to the settlement of disputes set out in Part 
VIII of the Agreement apply, mutatis mutandis, to any dispute between members of the 
Commission, whether or not they are also Parties to the Agreement.”). It is interesting to note 
Annex I(2), which provides that a dispute involving a fishing entity may be submitted to arbi-
tration according to “the relevant rules of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.” Id. at annex 
I(2). Furthermore, to avoid precedential value of this provision, Annex I(4) states that “this 
Annex relating to participation by fishing entities are solely for the purposes of this Conven-
tion.” Id. at annex I(4). 
 206. See Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, http:// 
www.ccsbt.org/docs/about.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2007) (“The Fishing Entity of Taiwan’s 
membership of the Extended Commission became effective on 30 August 2002.”). 
 207. Extended Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefish Tuna, Resolution 
to Establish an Extended Commission and an Extended Committee, http://www.ccsbt.org/ 
docs/pdf/about_the_commission/the_Extended_commission.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2008). 
 208. Convention for the Establishment of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commis-
sion (IATTC), U.S.– Costa Rica, May 31, 1949, 1 U.S.T. 230 [hereinafter Antigua 
Convention]. 
 209. The Quarterly Report Apr.– June 2003 of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Com-
mission 3 (2003), available at http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles2/IATTCq032ENG.pdf (“This 
resolution calls upon the observer from Taiwan to sign the new IATTC convention ‘under the 
name Chinese Taipei.’ ”). 
 210. See Antigua Convention, supra note 208, art. XXV (2) (“If a dispute is not settled 
through such consultation within a reasonable period, the members [may] settle the dispute 
through any peaceful means they may agree upon, in accordance with international law.”). 
 211. ITLOS, supra note 189, art. 288, para. 2 (emphasis added). 
 212. ITLOS, supra note 188, art. 20, para. 2 (emphasis added). 
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prises “all matters specifically provided for in any other agreement 
which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal.”213  
The PRC may argue that according to the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, the term “international agreement” refers to treaties that 
are “concluded between States”214 and, because Taiwan is not a State, 
the fishery agreements to which Taiwan is a party do not meet the re-
quirement set forth in Article 288 of the UN Convention for the Law of 
Sea. I disagree with this argument for the following reasons. The Vienna 
Convention does not preclude the fisheries agreement from the scope of 
international agreements. It clearly stipulates that the rules of that Con-
vention do not apply to certain international agreements, for instance, the 
one concluded between States and “other subjects of international 
law.”215 The Vienna Convention, hence, envisions treaties as only one 
type of international agreement. Even if fisheries agreements do not con-
stitute “treaties” in relation to Taiwan, they still qualify as international 
agreements within the meaning of Article 288 of the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea.  
Additionally, while Article 288 of the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea uses the term “international agreements,” Articles 20 and 21 of 
the ITLOS Statute use the term “any other agreement.” The omission of 
the adjective “international” enlarges the scope of jurisdiction under 
those agreements. As Gudmundur Eiriksson, former president of the 
ITLOS asserted, the agreements concluded with “entities whose interna-
tional status is unclear” should fall within the meaning of Article 288.216 
As a result, the fishery agreements concluded between foreign States and 
Taiwan would constitute international agreements under both the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea and the ITLOS Statute. 
Although Taiwan is not a “Contracting Party”—a term China deems 
to have sovereign implications—to the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea and to the UN Fish Stock Agreement, Taiwan is now widely 
recognized as a fishing entity. Under this new identity, Taiwan is enti-
tled to the rights other States possess under the multilateral fishery 
agreements and, more importantly, is able to resolve its fishing disputes 
in the ITLOS on the basis of the dispute settlement provisions of those 
agreements.  
                                                                                                                         
 213. ITLOS, supra note 188, art. 21 (emphasis added). 
 214. Vienna Convention, supra note 83, art. 2(a) (defining a treaty as “an international 
agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law.”) 
 215. Vienna Convention, supra note 83, art. 3.  
 216. See Gudmundur Eiriksson, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 115 
(2000) (“It can be argued that other entities . . . would fall under [Article 288(2) of the Con-
vention], for example, non-governmental organizations or natural or juridical persons or other 
entities whose international status is unclear.”). 
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3. World Trade Organization 
In comparison to ICJ jurisdiction, which is limited to the consent of 
“States,” the broadened jurisdiction under the ITLOS that is extended to 
other entities demonstrates the trend toward wider jurisdiction of inter-
national tribunals. This trend is further evidenced by the creation of the 
dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
which has evolved into one of the most vibrant global judicial dispute 
settlement systems in the past decade. As the 17th largest economy in the 
world, it is of great importance that Taiwan be able to utilize the system 
to resolve trade quarrels. Taiwan’s participation in WTO litigation as a 
“separate customs territory” reaffirms that Taiwan is considered to be an 
independent entity, even if it is not have the name of State in some judi-
cial proceedings. 
The WTO came into existence in 1995 based on the Agreement Es-
tablishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), concluded 
at the end of the Uruguay Round. The purpose of the WTO is to provide 
an integrated framework to its predecessor, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to which the ROC was a party, and other 
covered agreements. The pivotal innovation of the WTO is the dispute 
settlement system based on the new Dispute Settlement Understanding. 
The new Dispute Settlement Understanding prescribes the mandatory 
jurisdiction over WTO Members. This is different from most interna-
tional tribunals, where jurisdiction is generally bestowed by parties’ 
consent.217  
Should a Member find its rights under any covered agreement im-
paired by another Member, the former may resort to the Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism. The Dispute Settlement Understanding requires 
the Members to first engage in consultations to try to resolve the dispute 
without formal proceedings. If no mutually satisfactory results can be 
achieved, a Member may formally request the establishment of a panel 
to adjudicate its case.218 The panel is composed of three legal or trade 
experts chosen by the parties or appointed by the WTO Director-
General.219 The Dispute Settlement Mechanism also provides a standing 
                                                                                                                         
217. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal 
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [here-
inafter the DSU or Dispute Settlement Understanding]; see also World Trade Org., A 
Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System 8 (2004) (stating that due to the compul-
sory jurisdiction, “no responding party Member may escape from that jurisdiction”). 
 218. See DSU, supra note 217, art. 6.1 (“If the complaining party so requests, a panel 
shall be established at the latest at the DSB meeting following that at which the request first 
appears as an item on the DSB’s agenda . . . .”). 
 219. DSU, supra note 217, arts. 8.5 and 8.7. 
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appellate review institution, the Appellate Body, which consists of seven 
“judges,” to whom the parties to appeal.220 The panel and Appellate 
Body reports become binding after the adoption by the Dispute Settle-
ment Body, comprised of all WTO members, unless the Dispute 
Settlement Body determines by consensus not to adopt the reports.221 
This “negative consensus” approach remedies the problem that arose 
during the GATT period, where minority parties could “block” the adop-
tion of panel reports. The DSB may authorize the injured Member to 
request compensation or, by suspending its concession under relevant 
agreements, “retaliate” against the losing Member.222 The Dispute Set-
tlement Mechanism, which has dealt with 357 cases as of January 
2007,223 has been applauded for its contribution to the multilateral trad-
ing system and, for this reason, the Appellate Body has frequently been 
referred to as the “World Trade Court.”224 
a. Separate Customs Territory 
To examine whether Taiwan is entitled to access the WTO dispute 
settlement system, we must trace the ROC’s history in the WTO. In 1947, 
the ROC, then the only government of China, became one of the 23 con-
tracting parties to the GATT, the predecessor of the WTO.225 In 1950, the 
ROC could no longer fulfill GATT obligations undertaken on behalf of 
the mainland after losing the civil war. The government thus decided to 
withdraw from the GATT.226 In 1965, realizing the importance of expand-
ing foreign market access to Taiwan, the ROC applied for observer status, 
                                                                                                                         
 220. DSU, supra note 217, art. 17.1. For information on current Appellate Body Mem-
bers, see Dispute Settlement: Members, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ 
ab_members_descrp_e.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2007). 
 221. DSU, supra note 217, arts. 16.4 and 17.14. 
 222. DSU, supra note 217, art. 22. 
 223. Dispute Settlement: Disputes, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_ 
status_e.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2008). 
 224. See, e.g., Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Six Years on the Bench of the “World Trade 
Court”: Some Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the WTO, 36 J. 
World Trade 605, 605 (2002); see also Peter Van den Bossche, From Afterthought to Center-
piece: The WTO Appellate Body and Its Rise to Prominence in the World Trading System, 
Mattstricht Faculty of Law Working Papers 2005-1, at 2 (“The Appellate Body is now, in all 
but name, the World Trade Court.”). 
 225. Twenty-three original contracting members include Australia, Belgium, Brazil, 
Burma, Brazil, Canada, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, 
India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, South Africa, 
South Rhodesia, Syria, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Yang Guohua & Cheng 
Fin, The Process of China’s Accession to the WTO, 14 J. Int’l Econ. L. 297, 297 n.2 (2001). 
 226. Communication from Secretary-General of the United Nations Regarding China, 
GATT/CP/54 (Mar. 6, 1950), available at http://gatt.stanford.edu/search/advanced. 
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which was granted.227 However, in 1971, given the ROC’s loss of its UN 
seat, the GATT decided to expel Taiwan.228  
In 1990, Taiwan attempted to rejoin the GATT because of its new 
pragmatic policy, which sought wider participation in international or-
ganizations despite the PRC’s presence. Taiwan based its application on 
Article XXXIII of the GATT under the name of “The Customs Territory 
of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu,” abbreviated as “Chinese 
Taipei.”229 In Taiwan’s view, this name, albeit tedious, decreases sover-
eign disputes and reflects the ROC’s jurisdiction over Taiwan and other 
outlying islands.230  
The PRC fiercely opposed the ROC’s application because of its fear 
that Taiwan’s membership would strengthen its independent image by 
showing that Taiwan and China are of equal legal status.231 The PRC 
contended that Taiwan’s application was illegal because, as part of 
China, Taiwan’s membership, like that of Hong Kong, must be premised 
on Beijing’s confirmation.232 The PRC’s position is untenable for several 
reasons. First, the GATT membership requirement is based on “govern-
ments,” rather than “states.” Article XXXII:1 clearly stipulates that 
“[t]he contracting parties . . . shall be understood to be those govern-
ments.” To date, although the ROC’s status as a State is controversial, 
the ROC as the government of Taiwan is rarely challenged. This is why 
foreign governments and courts deemed the ROC to be an independent 
subject of international law.  
Furthermore, the PRC ignored the distinction between two accession 
provisions of the GATT, Article XXVI:5, on which Hong Kong’s mem-
bership application was based, and Article XXXIII, on which Taiwan 
                                                                                                                         
 227.  Chung-chou Li, Resumption of China’s GATT Membership, 21 J. World Trade L. 
25, 26 (1987). 
 228. Summary Record of the Second Meeting, GATT SR. 27/2 (Nov. 19, 1971). 
 229. See World Trade Organization, WTO Successfully Concludes Negotiations on 
Entry of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Sept. 18, 
2001) http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr244_e.htm. 
 230. Cf. Edwin Hsiao, New Strategy Could Prove Good WHO Medicine, Taiwan J., Apr. 
17, 2008, http://taiwanjournal.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?CtNode=122&xItem=36457 (reporting presi-
dent-elect Ma’s “displeasure with the government’s plan to apply for WHO membership using 
the name Taiwan.”). 
 231. See Note, Susanna Chan, Taiwan’s Application to the GATT: A New Urgency with 
the Conclusion of the Uruguay Round, 2 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 275, 285 (1994) 
(“[A]cceptance of the ROC’s application will promote international recognition of the ROC as 
the legitimate government of China” and that “reunification between Taiwan and China would 
become even more remote if the GATT recognizes the strength of Taiwan’s economy.”); 
Charles Wolf, Fault Lines in China’s Economic Terrain 160 (2003) (stating that the PRC 
believed Taiwan’s WTO membership “as a customs entity[] may enhance [its] de facto stature 
as an independent state”). 
 232. Lei Wang, Separate Customs Territory in GATT and Taiwan’s Request for GATT 
membership, 25 J. World Trade 5, 17, 19 (1991). 
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relied. According to Article XXVI:5, Hong Kong’s accession to the 
GATT in 1986 was due to the UK’s “sponsorship” because Hong Kong 
was a British territory, for which the UK possessed “international re-
sponsibility.”233 The PRC, prior to the takeover in 1997, also ensured 
that Hong Kong would continue to have “full autonomy in the conduct 
of its external commercial relations” and other GATT-related matters, 
thus maintaining Hong Kong’s status as required by Article XXVI:5(c) 
of the GATT.234 However, the ROC’s situation is inherently distinguish-
able from that of Hong Kong in both fact and law. Taiwan has never 
been under the de facto rule of the government of the PRC and, unlike 
Hong Kong, is not a colony. Pursuant to Article XXXIII of the GATT, 
the ROC is the government that applied for membership “acting on be-
half of” its territories and possesses “full autonomy” in foreign trade 
relations.235 Consequently, the ROC is entitled to GATT membership on 
its own behalf without the PRC’s sponsorship.  
It is noteworthy that the 1992 GATT Council specifically expounded 
that in examining the accession process of China and Taiwan, “the work-
ing party reports should be examined independently.” 236  After the 
establishment of the WTO in 1994, Taiwan changed its application 
based on both XXIII of the GATT and Article XII of the WTO Agree-
ment.237 On January 1, 2002, Taiwan finally joined the WTO as a 
“separate customs territory,” a new identity for Taiwan in international 
law. Similar to the concept of a “fishing entity” in multilateral fishery 
agreements, Taiwan’s accession to the WTO indicates its independent 
status. 
b. Participation in WTO Litigation 
The WTO dispute resolution mechanism is recognized as “a central 
element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trad-
                                                                                                                         
 233. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXVI:5(a), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-
11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT](“Each government accepting this Agreement does so 
in respect of its metropolitan territory and of the other territories for which it has international 
responsibility . . . .”). 
 234. See Chung-chou Li, Resumption of China’s GATT Membership, 21 J. World Trade 
L. 25, 43 (1987) (According to the UK-PRC Agreement, the PRC promised that “the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region shall be a separate customs territory. It may participate 
in relevant international organizations and international trade agreements . . . . .”); see also, 
GATT, supra note 233, art. XXVI:5(c). 
 235. GATT, supra note 233, art. XXXIII. 
 236. Analytical Index, Guide to GATT Law and Practice 944 (6th ed. 1994) (emphasis 
added). 
 237. See GATT, supra note 233, art. XXXIII; see also Marrakesh Agreement Establish-
ing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, art. XII (stating that “any State or separate 
customs territory . . . may accede to this Agreement.”)  
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ing system.”238 This section analyzes whether Taiwan, as a separate cus-
toms territory, has the same access to the judicial system as other States, 
and whether Taiwan can solve its trade disputes with China at the WTO. 
As a starting point, it is important to understand that the WTO considers 
“States” and “separate customs territories” to be equal “Members,” and, 
hence, Taiwan is entitled to full access to the Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism. The WTO has proven to be efficient in dealing with Tai-
wan’s trade conflicts, as many of them were unable to be resolved 
bilaterally because of a lack of diplomatic ties.239 Since the US–Steel 
Safeguards case, Taiwan’s first complaint against US safety measures on 
steel products in 2002, the country has participated as a “third party” in 
29 cases as of February 2007.240 Although Taiwan has not yet been a 
“real party” to disputes, as other new Members have, the country’s third 
party experiences have helped to familiarize it with WTO legal proceed-
ings. Taiwan has appeared before the panels in 16 cases,241 and before 
the Appellate Body in 10 cases, of which the Appellate Body examined 
Taiwan’s submissions in three cases.242 Because Taiwan is able to con-
tribute its own legal interpretation, its utilization of the Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism is beneficial to the trading system as a whole. 
Other Members also benefit because they can now appeal to the Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism to request Taiwan’s removal of WTO-
                                                                                                                         
 238. DSU, supra note 217, art. 3.2. 
 239. For instance, in 1999, Argentina and Poland imposed import restrictions on certain 
textile products from Taiwan. Followed by Taiwan’s accession to the WTO, the government 
requested that Argentina and Poland comply with WTO non-discriminatory obligations. Sub-
sequently, both countries notified Taiwan of the termination of restriction measures by 2002. 
Major Responsibilities, Permanent Mission of Taiwan to the WTO, available at 
http://www.taiwanwto.ch/about_mission/achievements.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2007). 
 240. In US—Steel Safeguards (DS274), Taiwan requested consultations with the United 
States but did not join the other 8 Members as complaining parties in panel and Appellate 
Body proceedings. Taiwan participated as a third party in that case. See Member Information: 
Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei) and the 
WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/chinese_taipei_e.htm (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2007); see also DSU, supra note 217, art. 10.2 (“Any Member having a substantial 
interest in a matter before a panel and having notified its interest to the DSB (referred to in 
this Understanding as a ‘third party’) shall have an opportunity to be heard by the panel and to 
make written submissions to the panel.”).  
 241. See Parties and Third Parties in WTO Panel Proceedings, http://worldtradelaw.net 
(last visited November 26, 2007). 
 242. Appellate Body Annual Report for 2006, WT/AB/7 (Jan. 23, 2007), at 34–36. The 
three cases include US-Gambling, WT/DS285/AB/R, US-Countervailing Duty Investigation 
on DRAMS, WT/DS296/AB/R, and US-Zeroing (EC), WT/DS294/AB/R. In the other seven 
cases before the Appellate Body, Taiwan participated in the oral hearing without submitting 
written submissions pursuant to Rule 24(2) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review.  
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inconsistent measures, rather than simply exercising political pressure as 
in the past.243  
The application of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism to 
China-Taiwan trade disputes has drawn the world’s attention. China 
claimed that cross-strait disputes are solely internal affairs and, accord-
ing to its one China principle, such disputes should be resolved 
bilaterally and not within the WTO.244 China erred because its one China 
principle cannot override the WTO’s compulsory jurisdiction under 
which both China and Taiwan are on equal footing. In fact, recent cross-
strait trade disputes have shown that China has realized that failure to 
interact with Taiwan would place China in violation of WTO rules. 
In May 2005, without notifying the Taiwanese government as re-
quired by Article 12 of the Safeguard Agreement, China imposed 
provisional safeguard measures against steel products imported from 
Taiwan.245 Hence, Taiwan’s WTO Mission formally requested consulta-
tions with the PRC. China’s WTO Mission replied to Taiwan by letter, 
but addressed Taiwan’s Mission as the “economic trade office,” the title 
that Hong Kong and Macau use, rather than Taiwan’s official title “Per-
manent Representative Mission,” which China considers to have 
sovereign implications.246 Taiwan immediately responded, referring to 
China’s slight as “inappropriate” and again requested consultations pur-
suant to WTO rules.247 Afraid that Taiwan would bring the case to the 
WTO and further enhance the “two States” impression, China finally 
held a meeting with Taiwan at the latter’s Mission on November 12, 
2002.248 Although no concrete results were reached in this first-ever 
cross-strait meeting under the WTO framework, it paved the way for the 
two sides to resolve disputes and bypass their political deadlock.  
                                                                                                                         
 243. For example, in January 2007, the Dutch electronic company, Phillips, requested 
that the European Commission sue Taiwan under the WTO because of Taiwan’s compulsory 
licensing of Phillips CD-Rom patents, which allegedly constituted a violation under the 
Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights [hereinafter TRIPS]. If the European 
Commission takes the case, Taiwan will face its first legal challenge under the WTO. Kathrin 
Hille, Philips Seeks WTO help in Taiwan Dispute (Jan. 15, 2007), Financial Times, available 
at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/7ec05692-a447-11db-bec4-0000779e2340,_i_rssPage=fce0dcea-
3017-11da-ba9f-00000e2511c8.html.  
 244. China Says WTO No Place for Solving Trade Disputes, Taipei Times, Nov. 1, 
2001, at A1.  
 245. Only a private steel association in Taiwan was informed. See Agreement on Safe-
guards, art. 12.3 (“A Member proposing to apply or extend a safeguard measure shall provide 
adequate opportunity for prior consultations with those Members having a substantial interest 
as exporters of the product concerned . . . .”). 
 246. C.H. Lu & P.C. Tang, Effect of WTO Talks on Cross-Strait Relations Still an Open 
Question, Central News Agency (Taiwan), Dec. 16, 2002.  
 247. Id. 
 248. See id. Prior to the meeting, two sides reached an implicit agreement that China 
would not address the Taiwan Mission as “economic and trade office” or “Taipei, China.” 
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The cross-strait trade conflicts do not stop here. The steel dispute 
was soon followed by the “towel war.” In May 2006, Taiwan’s local 
towel manufacturers applied for import relief contending that cheap 
Chinese-made towels were flooding the market in Taiwan, causing a 
substantial decline in sales of locally made towels.249 The government 
initiated both anti-dumping and safeguard investigations. To meet the 
WTO notification requirements, Taiwan’s WTO Mission again re-
quested consultations with its Chinese counterpart. At their meeting, 
Chinese representatives expressed that, although China could accept 
anti-dumping measures, they found Taiwan’s safeguard measures dis-
criminatory.250 This time, cross-strait interactions went even beyond the 
meetings. To assist Chinese towel industries, four PRC officials from the 
Ministry of Commerce made a groundbreaking visit, attending a public 
hearing held in Taipei as consultants.251 An ROC official from the Minis-
try of Finance also traveled to China to investigate the normal value of 
Chinese products.252  
In my view, one of the greatest contributions of the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism is to make such direct talks, as well as “official” 
visits, across the Taiwan Strait possible. Geneva is now the focal point 
for bridging the gap between Beijing and Taipei. The WTO provides a 
rules-based forum for both China and Taiwan, thereby reducing cross-
strait political tensions. The WTO experience demonstrates that bringing 
Taiwan into international tribunals enhances not only global justice but 
also China-Taiwan relations. 
B. Reasons for Accessing International Courts  
The new trend of multilateral agreements and international courts is 
to relax the rigid “State” requirements so that they are able to accommo-
date Taiwan, which possesses full autonomy both domestically and 
internationally. Taiwan’s identity as a fishing entity or a separate cus-
                                                                                                                         
 249.  See Taipei, Beijing Officials Tackle Towel Tussle at WTO, Taipei Times, June. 24, 
2006, at A11; see also S.C. Chang, Committee Rules China’s Towel Dumping Hurts Taiwan 
Businesses, Central News Agency (Taiwan), Aug. 29, 2006 (“By 2005, Chinese imports had 
taken a 70 percent share of Taiwan’s towel market, causing ‘evident and adverse impact’ on 
the domestic towel industry.”); Susan Yu, ITC Concludes Towel Business Should Get Relief 
(Mar. 24, 2006) http://www.taiwan.com.au/Polieco/Industry/20060327.html. 
 250. Taipei, Beijing Officials Tackle Towel Tussle at WTO, supra note 249.  
 251. David Lague, Taiwan Takes on China in WTO, International Herald Tribune, Apr. 
5, 2006, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/04/04/business/wto.php.  
 252. Sofia Wu, Taiwan Official Visits China for Anti-Dumping Probes, Central News 
Agency (Taiwan), June 14, 2006. Finding that the sales of Chinese towels were below market 
value, Taiwan’s Ministry of Finance announced on September 19, 2006 that it would impose a 
provisional 204.1% anti-dumping tax on imported Chinese towels. Deborah Kuo, Taiwan 
Imposing 204 Percent Anti-Dumping Tax on Chinese Towels, Central News Agency (Tai-
wan), Sept. 19, 2006. 
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toms territory allows Taiwan to avoid the obstacle of recognition and 
utilize international tribunals to resolve disputes. Furthermore, it but-
tresses Taiwan’s claim of being a subject of international law 
independent of the PRC. International tribunals’ extension of jurisdiction 
to Taiwan mirrors, to some extent, the approach of many domestic 
courts, which deems Taiwan to be a State for statutory purposes. It is 
both pragmatic and necessary for international courts to grant standing to 
Taiwan for three reasons. 
First, the denial of standing before international courts will inevita-
bly shield Taiwan from shouldering its own State responsibility. It is 
neither justified nor reasonable to hold the PRC liable for wrongs com-
mitted by Taiwan. Under international law, a State bears responsibility if 
it engages in wrongful international acts in violation of its international 
obligations.253 According to the ICJ in F.R.G. v. Poland (the Chorzow 
Factory case), a breach of such obligations, in turn, “involves an obliga-
tion to make reparation.”254 If an international tribunal upheld the PRC 
version of the “one China” principle, the PRC would be obliged to make 
reparation for Taiwan’s wrongful acts. Additionally, enforcing judg-
ments for wrongs committed by Taiwan would be problematic because 
China does not have control over Taiwan.  
Domestic courts have perceived this problem, which is why the Ca-
nadian court in Romania v. Cheng rejected the PRC’s request for 
jurisdiction and transferred suspected crews to Taiwan, the flag State 
responsible for adjudicating the case. WTO rules further show that, 
should measures adopted by Taiwan be inconsistent with WTO rules, it 
is Taiwan, not China, that should bring the measures into conformity or 
suffer trade retaliation. These examples should inform international tri-
bunals; if Taiwan is granted standing before the courts, the injured States 
can directly ask Taiwan to bear State responsibility, thereby promptly 
resolving disputes.  
Second, denying Taiwan access to international courts will deprive 
its 23 million nationals of their individual human rights. It is frequently 
argued that, by granting individual access to certain international courts 
and tribunals, such as the European Court of Human Rights or treaty-
based human rights committees,255 international law has gradually de-
                                                                                                                         
 253. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. 
GAOR Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Nov. 2001).  
 254. The Factory at Chorzow (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 24 (Sept. 
13). 
 255. For example, committees established under Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention for the Elimination of 
All Form of Racial Discrimination may receive complaints from individuals whose states are 
parties to those treaties.  
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parted from the embedded Westphalian concept of sovereign States. 
Nonetheless, the very premise of the State requirement, which most in-
ternational courts require, has not yet eroded. If a national’s human 
rights are infringed upon by another State, a remedy can be found if their 
governments exercise diplomatic protection and seek international re-
dress for them.256 A dire situation could arise concerning ROC citizens if 
the country is denied standing before international courts. ROC nationals 
will be deprived of the opportunity to assert their rights, and infractions 
on these rights will go unpunished.  
The PRC may assert that it is entitled to exercise protection on be-
half its “nationals” on Taiwan. This position ignores the holding of the 
Nottebohm case. In that case, Frederic Nottebohm was a German na-
tional who lived in Guatemala for 34 years and later became a 
naturalized citizen of Liechtenstein. Nottebohm’s connection with 
Liechtenstein was tenuous. In fact, he had only paid the country a few 
brief visits. When he returned to Guatemala in 1940 under his Liechten-
stein passport, Nottebohm was deemed to be an enemy alien since 
Guatemala had sided with the Allies during World War II. As a result, 
the Guatemalan government deported him and expropriated his property. 
After the war, Liechtenstein brought the case against Guatemala to the 
ICJ, seeking damages. The ICJ agreed with Guatemala’s argument, find-
ing that despite Nottebohm’s Liechtenstein citizenship, he was not a 
national of Liechtenstein under international law, given the lack of 
“genuine connection” with that country.257 The ICJ dismissed the case. 
In my view, the PRC’s desire to exercise protection of nationals of Tai-
wan can hardly overcome the “genuine connection” threshold. The 
relationship between the PRC and people in Taiwan is even more remote 
than the relationship between Liechtenstein and Nottebohm, as most 
Taiwanese people have never set foot in mainland China and do not pos-
sess PRC citizenship. Therefore, by denying Taiwan’s standing, 
international tribunals would render 23 million ROC citizens “stateless” 
                                                                                                                         
 256. See The Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railways Case (Est. v. Lith.), 1939 P.C.I.J., ser. 
A/B, No. 76, at 13 (Feb. 28) (“[I]n the absence of a special agreement, it is the bond of nation-
ality between the State and the individual which alone confers upon the State the right of 
diplomatic protection . . . .”).  
 257. The ICJ defined nationality as “a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of at-
tachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the 
existence of reciprocal rights and duties.” Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. (Apr. 
6). See also David L. Nersessian, The Razor’s Edge: Defining and Protecting Human Groups 
Under the Genocide Convention, 36 Cornell Int’l L.J. 293, 301–02 (2003) (detailing the Not-
tebohm case and discussing criticism regarding the ICJ’s rulings). 
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and divest them of their human rights, which are presumably “univer-
sal.”258 
Finally, the world as a whole would suffer social and economic costs 
if international tribunals are unable to resolve disputes concerning Tai-
wan. As a significant trading nation, Taiwan has concluded numerous 
bilateral agreements, such as double taxation and investment treaties. 
Similar agreements concluded between other States usually designate an 
international tribunal, such as the ICJ, the Permanent Court of Arbitra-
tion, or the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
under the World Bank, to adjudicate disputes arising from those agree-
ments. Given Taiwan’s inability to access international courts, 
contracting parties are precluded from resorting to rule-based judicial 
forums and can only rely on uncertain political bargains in disputes with 
Taiwan. This prolongs the process and incurs higher economic costs. 
This situation undermines the foundation and the goals of the interna-
tional courts, which are to promote predictability and prompt settlement 
of global disputes in a peaceful way.  
The WTO’s dispute settlement system, to which Taiwan has access, 
provides a prime example of why Taiwan should be incorporated into 
the international judicial system. The world has witnessed the WTO’s 
success in facilitating the resolution of trade conflicts between Taiwan 
and the rest of the world in a cost efficient way. The fact that China and 
Taiwan can now resolve their quarrels through the WTO’s rule-based 
system further vindicates this view. I believe that the WTO experience 
should inform the global community and international courts. A simpler 
question is, if international courts are incapable of resolving conflicts 
involving Taiwan, can such courts still be called “international? ” 
Conclusion 
Since its loss of the China seat in the United Nations, the Republic 
of China on Taiwan has become the most renowned example of an “un-
recognized State” under international law. This Article has argued that 
despite this unrecognized status, the ROC should be considered a State 
for statutory purposes in judicial proceedings in foreign and international 
courts. Moreover, this Article finds that China has been a “divided 
                                                                                                                         
 258. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) (Art. 1 provides that “[a]ll human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights,” while Article 2 states that “[e]veryone is 
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any 
kind, such as . . . political or other opinion, national or . . . birth or other status” (emphasis 
added).  
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State” since the establishment of the PRC on mainland China and the 
ROC’s relocation to Taiwan. The ROC and the PRC are two equal enti-
ties under international law. The practice of foreign courts vindicates 
this view by ruling that Taiwan, which meets the criteria for statehood 
under the Montevideo Convention, never lost its State status as a result 
of derecognition. Whether relying on statutory or common law, courts in 
diverse jurisdictions almost uniformly confirm the validity of Taiwan’s 
rights to treaties and property concluded and acquired prior to derecogni-
tion. By so doing, foreign courts rejected the PRC’s claim that it has 
“succeeded” the ROC. The judicial recognition of treating Taiwan as a 
foreign State has risen to the level of an “international custom,” creating 
a binding effect on all tribunals.  
The issue of Taiwan’s standing before international courts is com-
plex, given the State requirements to access those courts. In the case of 
the International Court of Justice, this Article argues that Taiwan may 
file a declaration with the ICJ declaring its acceptance of the Court’s 
jurisdiction, although Taiwan incurs high political risks for pursuing this 
course of action. In certain fields of international law, the global com-
munity has begun to share the views of the domestic courts and has 
started to carefully carve out exceptions to accommodate Taiwan. Thus, 
Taiwan is now widely recognized as a fishing entity and a separate cus-
toms territory in multilateral fisheries agreements and within the World 
Trade Organization, respectively. In turn, Taiwan’s new identities form a 
legal basis for the nation to access the International Tribunal for the Law 
of the Sea and the WTO dispute settlement system. Although this ar-
rangement reflects a reluctant political compromise between the 
international community and the PRC, it avoids the undesirable creation 
of a “judicial black hole.”  
The Taiwan question has stirred intense political debate in the inter-
national arena for many decades. Despite Taiwan’s absence of 
recognition, the international community has accorded Taiwan status as 
an independent entity or territory, thereby accepting Taiwan as a subject 
of international law. Although political situations surrounding both Tai-
wan and the world have changed rapidly, the fairness of every judicial 
system should remain constant. Consequently, political obstacles should 
not preclude the fundamental goal of the courts, which is to pursue jus-
tice. Recognizing that global fairness and justice should be universally 
applied without national boundaries, Taiwan should be entitled to its day 
in court. 
